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Abstract
FINANCIAL REPORTING DIFFERENCES AND DEBT CONTRACTING
By
Anna Bergman Brown
Adviser: Donal Byard
I examine the relationship between contracting parties’ familiarity with one another’s accounting
information and the terms and structure of debt contracts. I use the differences in generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) among contracting parties domiciled in different
countries as a proxy for how familiar a lending bank will be with a borrower’s accounting
information. I find that a larger difference between the GAAP of the lender and the GAAP of
the borrower is associated with a higher credit spread and higher fees. I also find that a larger
difference between the GAAP of the lender and the GAAP of the borrower is associated with a
more concentrated loan syndicate, suggesting a closer monitoring relationship between the
borrower and the lender. Finally, I find that when there is a larger difference between the GAAP
of the lender and the GAAP of the borrower, banks rely less on financial covenants as a
contracting tool. Moreover, banks tend to alter the types of covenants they write, relying more
on capital-based financial covenants and less on earnings-based covenants. My results are
consistent with banks experiencing information problems when contracting with parties whose
accounting information they find to be unfamiliar. These results provide new evidence on the
importance of financial reporting for debt contracting.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
1. Introduction
In this dissertation, I examine the association between a lender’s familiarity with a
borrower’s accounting information and the terms of debt contracts and the structure of loan
syndicates. Accounting information plays two principal roles in debt contracting: accounting
information helps the bank make an initial assessment of the borrower’s credit risk and helps the
bank monitor the borrower’s ongoing credit risk over the life of the loan through debt covenants.
A lending bank experiences information asymmetry with a borrower as the borrower has private
information about its own credit risk. Publicly available accounting information can reduce
information asymmetries between contracting parties to the extent that the bank is able to
understand and use accounting information for its two principal contracting roles. When a bank
is more familiar with a borrower’s accounting information, the bank should experience a greater
ease in contracting using the borrower’s accounting information. Therefore, ceteris paribus, a
bank’s familiarity with a borrower’s accounting information should be associated with lower
information asymmetry between these two contracting parties.
As a proxy for a bank’s familiarity with a borrower’s accounting information, I use
differences in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) between banks and borrowers
domiciled in different countries. As I isolate borrowers and lenders that are subject to different
accounting standards and these differences can be measured, I exploit a unique and powerful
setting to test the effects of differences in accounting information between lenders and borrowers
on debt contracting. In addition, because of my choice of setting, I am also able to address the
question of how diversity in international accounting standards across countries affects debt
contracting.
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In this literature review chapter, I first review the institutional background on information
asymmetries and debt contracting. I next discuss the literature on the debt contracting role of
accounting information, and how accounting information is used to reduce information
asymmetry in a debt contracting setting. In addition, as my setting examines loan contracting in
an international setting, I review the literature on debt contracting and international accounting
standards. While substantial prior literature has addressed international accounting standards and
equity markets, relatively little research has addressed the effects of international accounting
standards on debt markets.
In section 2, I discuss the institutional background of information asymmetry in debt
contracting. In section 3, I examine the literature on the role of accounting information in debt
contracting. In section 4, I discuss the literature on international accounting standards and debt
contracting. Finally, section 5 concludes and discusses how my own research helps fill some of
the gaps in the extant literature.
2. Information Asymmetry in Debt Contracting
In private bank loans, theory proposes that information asymmetries among contracting
parties will affect the terms of the loan and the design of an optimal contract (Leland and Pyle,
1977; Holmstrom, 1982; Diamond, 1984). In these types of contracting arrangements, banks
contract directly with the borrower to establish the terms of the loan. This type of relationship
banking contrasts with public debt markets, where arm’s length transactions and dispersed loan
ownership prevents the direct contracting relationship. For this reason, private bank loans tend
to emerge as an area of interest for studies of the effects of accounting information on debt
contracting. In addition, banks are among the most sophisticated users of financial statements
(Bharath et al., 2008), so private bank loans represent a setting in which researchers may
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implement a somewhat conservative test of the effects of accounting information on debt
contracting.

Furthermore, private debt relies heavily on monitoring and the relationships

between the contracting parties, which may represent a mechanism by which to overcome poor
accounting quality. In addition, the availability of bank loan contract data allows researchers to
directly measure a variety of contract terms across a large sample of loan contracts through
Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan. Finally, the prevalence of accountingbased debt covenants in bank loans (as compared to their paucity in public debt) makes this
market a good setting to test if and how contracting parties rely on accounting information. For
this reason, the literature has seen an emergence of research examining the information
asymmetry among contracting parties using private bank loan data and accounting information.
As private bank loans rely on relationship banking, one or more banks contract directly
with the borrowing firm to establish the terms of the loan. In bilateral loans, a single bank
contracts directly with the borrower to establish the amount of the loan and the terms, including
the maturity, the credit spread, and the covenants. The lending bank makes an assessment of the
borrower’s credit risk and forms a private relationship with the borrower to facilitate the transfer
of private information and the monitoring of borrower activities over the life of the loan. In the
syndicated loan market (loans involving a syndicate of two or more lending banks), one or more
bank acts as the lead arranger (or “lead bank”) and works with the borrower to establish the
terms of the loan in a preliminary loan agreement. The preliminary loan agreement is signed
when the lead bank and the borrower agree on the major terms of the loan: the loan amount,
maturity, debt covenants, and a range for the credit spread.

Subsequent to signing the

preliminary loan agreement, the lead bank will seek out other banks to participate in the
syndicate. The non-lead (“participant”) banks must also approve the terms of the loan, and have

3

the power to propose changes to the preliminary loan agreement before agreeing to participate in
the syndicate. The final loan contract is signed when all syndicate members have agreed upon
the terms of the loan contract and the lead bank has established the structure of the syndicate,
including the number of participant banks involved and the amount of the loan each bank will
hold.
In syndicated loans, information asymmetry may also exist between the lead bank and the
other syndicate participants. This information asymmetry results from the private relationship
the lead bank develops with the borrower, and the private information the lead bank obtains from
the borrower. This private information may result in ex ante adverse selection, whereby
participant banks fear that the lead bank is withholding private information or misrepresenting
the real credit quality of the borrower. In addition, given that the lead bank’s effort in
performing due diligence and monitoring the borrower is unobservable, there is also the potential
for ex post moral hazard. Participant banks may fear that the lead bank will shirk its monitoring
duties, which require costly time and effort.
3. Accounting Information and Debt Contracting
3.1 Debt Contracting Value of Accounting Information
The idea that the primary role of accounting information is that of facilitating contracts
dates back to Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986). Watts and Zimmerman propose that a firm is
essentially a nexus of contracts, and that the primary role of accounting information is to
facilitate the formation and performance of those contracts. As the authors attempt to develop a
theory of the factors determining accounting standards, their research examines the forces within
a country, including those at the firm level, which drive the formation of accounting standards
within a country. Watts and Zimmerman’s theory of the firm suggests that debt contracting
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demands informative, verifiable performance measures. Accounting information has evolved to
facilitate this debt contracting role through a preference for verifiable account over relevant
accounting numbers.

Despite the plethora of research examining the value of accounting

information for equity valuation, the role of accounting information in debt contracting is
paramount.
Despite the importance of accounting information in debt contracting, empirical research
examining the effect of accounting numbers on debt contracts has primarily emerged only over
the last few years. Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) are perhaps the first to explicitly refer to a
“debt contracting value” of accounting information and to attempt to quantify this value. The
authors argue that for accounting information to be most suitable for debt contracting, it must
capture credit quality deterioration in a timely manner.

Accounting information that is

informative about the borrower’s credit quality, and that reflects changes in credit quality in a
timely manner, will be best suited for debt contracting. This should allow the lead bank in the
syndicate to use the accounting information to make assessments of credit risk and to write into
the contract in the form of debt covenants. Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari propose that the
accounting information which is better suited for debt contracting will result in a lower
information asymmetry between the bank and the borrower. They develop a measure of the
“debt-contracting value”, or DCV: an industry-level measure of ability of accounting earnings to
predict deterioration in credit ratings over time. The authors find that debt contracts involving
borrowers whose DCV is high result in a less-concentrated loan syndicate, where the lead bank
holds a smaller proportion of the loan. This suggests that banks monitor borrowers more
carefully when DCV is low, and thus contracting on accounting numbers is relatively more
difficult or less reliable.
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Sufi (2007) examines a question that is similar in nature to Ball, Bushman and Vasvari’s
(2008). In this study, Sufi also examines a sample of syndicate loans and attempts to capture the
strength of the monitoring relationship through the percent of the loan held by the lead bank.
However, Sufi refers more broadly to the opacity of the information environment, which
encompasses the accounting information environment, as well as the credit ratings environment.
However, the motivation of the hypothesis is still similar:

a transparent information

environment, in the form of readily available, high quality financial reports, and public credit
ratings, may reduce information asymmetry among debt contracting parties. Sufi uses the
availability of SEC filings and credit ratings as a proxy for the strength of the information
environment, where borrowers are deemed information opaque if they are lacking in one or both
of these areas. The study provides evidence that the lead bank forms a more concentrated
syndicate when borrowers have an opaque information environment. One important conclusion
of this study is that lenders compensate for a lack of transparent accounting information by
monitoring borrowers more carefully through the lending relationship.
3.2 Debt Contracting and Accounting Quality
A number of studies attempt to capture the relationship between accounting information
and debt contracting by identifying a setting in which borrowers may have lower accounting
quality. A large body of literature has studied accounting quality in the setting of equity markets,
leading to generally accepted proxies for high quality financial reporting for equity market
purposes. However, settling on a measure of accounting quality for debt contracting purposes
may not be as simple as borrowing from the equity markets literature. This issue is reminiscent
of the fair value vs. historical cost accounting debate of relevant accounting information vs.
reliable and verifiable accounting information. For this reason, a number of studies have studied
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the association between accounting quality and debt contracting, using multiple proxies of
borrower accounting quality.
One study which examines the effects of accounting information quality on information
asymmetry between debt contracting parties is Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008). In this study, the
authors focus on a sample of restating firms, under the hypothesis that firms which have
experienced an earnings restatement are a greater information risk for lenders. If an earnings
restatement is an indication that accounting information is less reliable, a bank may perceive a
borrower with a recent earnings restatement to be riskier than a borrower without an earnings
restatement, ceteris paribus. The authors find evidence that borrowers with recent accounting
restatements experience loan contracts with higher credit spreads, shorter maturities, a greater
likelihood of being secured, and more debt covenants. They conclude that transparent and
reliable accounting information may reduce information asymmetries between a borrower and a
lender, and result in more lenient loan contract terms. Following an earnings restatement, a bank
experiences greater information asymmetry with the borrower as accounting information is
perceived as less reliable, and therefore cannot fulfill its role of reducing information asymmetry.
This study further suggests that lenders compensate for borrowers which post an information risk
by imposing a greater number of covenant restrictions.

These results run contrary to the

expectation that accounting information must be perceived as informative and reliable in order to
best fulfill the contracting role of writing debt covenants.
Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) examine another setting in which lenders may
perceive a borrower to be an information risk: a report of material internal control weaknesses.
The authors use the setting of borrowers which have received a report of material internal control
weaknesses as a proxy for poor quality financial reporting and the ensuing greater information
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risk.

This study provides evidence that lenders tend to trade-off between monitoring

mechanisms. When contracting with borrowers with recent material internal control weaknesses,
lenders tend to change a higher credit spread and rely on performance pricing measures tied to a
borrower’s credit ratings. In turn, lenders decrease their reliance on financial covenants and
performance pricing measures tied to accounting numbers. This study suggests that accounting
information must be perceived as both informative and reliable in order to be most appropriate
for debt contracting. This study further suggests that in the event of information risk, lenders
tend to avoid contracting mechanisms relying on accounting numbers, and substitute contracting
mechanisms which rely on non-accounting performance measures. Further, in contrast with
Graham, Li, and Qiu’s (2008) results, Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) provide
evidence that lenders most readily rely on financial covenants as a contracting mechanism when
they perceive a borrower’s accounting information to be reliable and transparent. This suggests
that financial covenants, rather than being simply another element of a restrictive loan package,
are in fact a sophisticated contracting mechanism which requires a thorough understanding of a
borrower’s financial reporting.
Bharath, Sunder and Sunder (2008) study the effects of accounting quality on debt
contracting using a traditional proxy for accounting quality from the equity markets literature.
The authors use abnormal operating accruals as a measure of a borrower’s financial reporting
quality. Abnormal operating accruals are a widely-used measure of accounting quality in the
literature examining the effects of accounting quality on equity markets. Specifically for debt
contracting, large abnormal operating accruals suggest large deviations between earnings and
operating cash flows. If these deviations are unexpected, and lenders therefore cannot reliably
anticipate operating cash flows, then borrowers with large abnormal operating accruals may

8

present a greater information risk, as well as a greater credit risk. The authors propose that
accounting quality, as measure by abnormal operating accruals, will affect a borrowing firm’s
choice of public vs. private debt, as well as the terms of loan contracts in both public and private
debt markets. This study provides evidence that borrowers with poorer accounting quality are
more likely to choose private debt. The authors interpret this result as evidence that private
banking relationships in the private debt market allow borrowers to transmit private information
to their lenders, thus helping to overcome adverse selection costs. In public debt markets, on the
other hand, financing is at arm’s-length relationships, and thus the reliance on high quality
publicly-available accounting information is paramount.

In addition, the authors find that

borrowers with poor accounting quality experience higher credit spreads in both private and
public debt markets, though the effect of accounting quality on credit spreads is significantly
higher in public debt markets.

However, in private debt markets, borrowers with poor

accounting quality also experience stricter non-price terms, namely maturity and collateral.
Overall, this study provides evidence that while high quality publicly-available accounting
information affects debt contracting in both private and public markets, the relationship banking
in private debt markets mitigates some adverse selection costs, and allows for alternative
contracting mechanisms.
3.3 Performance Pricing and Financial Covenants
Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) examine the use of performance pricing in loan
contracts.

Performance pricing is a relatively new contracting mechanism which links a

borrower’s credit spread to a measure of firm performance, and thus allows the credit spread to
change over the life of the loan contract. The authors identify two different types of performance
pricing. Interest-increasing performance pricing commits borrowers to a credit spread which
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increases in the event of poor borrower performance. Interest-decreasing performance pricing
allows credit spreads to decrease in the event of superior borrower performance. Performance
pricing measures can be tied to accounting numbers, such as earnings, or alternatively can be tied
to credit quality measures such as credit ratings.

The authors find evidence that interest-

increasing performance pricing is associated with significantly reduced credit spread, while
interest-decreasing performance pricing is only marginally associated with higher credit spread.
The authors conclude that the primary pricing effect of performance pricing is that lenders are
willing to offer reduced credit spreads in exchange for interest-increasing performance pricing.
The authors further find some evidence that interest-increasing performance pricing is more
common for inferior quality lenders: they find that lenders tend to add interest-increasing
performance pricing provisions in exchange for lower credit spreads when credit ratings
downgrades are more likely. These results suggest that lenders extract rent from lower quality
borrowers by offering a lower credit spread up front, in exchange for increasing credit spreads in
the future.

This method is intuitive, akin to a mortgage lender offering variable interest

mortgages to prospective home buyers with poor credit quality.
Nikolaev (2010) also examines the effects of a characteristic of a borrower’s accounting
quality on the reliance on financial covenants in loan contracts. Specifically, Nikolaev examines
whether borrowers that tend to have loan contracts with more financial covenant restrictions also
tend to have more timely loss recognition. Similar to Ball, Bushman and Vasvari (2008), the
author argues that for accounting information to be most appropriate for debt contracting, and
thus to best serve the role of reducing information asymmetry between contracting parties, it
must provide a timely signal of deteriorating credit quality. One way to test this hypothesis is to
examine whether lenders tend to write loan contracts with more financial covenant restrictions
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when borrowers have timely loss recognition.

The author finds evidence of a positive

association between a borrower’s timely recognition of economic losses in accounting earnings
and the reliance on financial covenants. This suggests that lenders tend to trade off different
contracting mechanisms, relying most on financial covenants when accounting earnings provide
a timely signal of deteriorating credit quality.
Finally, Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) examine the use of two different types of
accounting-based covenants: performance covenants and capital covenants.

Performance

covenants rely on performance measures such as accounting earnings or operating cash flows.
These covenants set a minimum performance threshold whereby if a borrower’s performance
falls below this threshold, the bank steps in a takes control for the borrowing firm, presumably to
renegotiate and extract rents. Capital-based covenants set minimum levels of working capital,
maximum levels of debt, or minimum levels of net worth. These covenants serve to restrict
borrower behavior: minimum levels of working capital restrict investment behavior, and
maximum levels of debt restrict financing behavior. The authors provide evidence that lenders
tend to trade-off between these two types of financial covenants and about the determinants of
each type of covenant. As capital-based covenants restrict borrower behavior, borrowers which
face greater financial constraint tend to have loan contracts with more performance-based
covenants. In addition, and perhaps, most notably, this study suggests that performance-based
covenants are most effective when a borrower’s accounting information provides a timely signal
of underlying credit risk. This is due to the trip-wire feature, whereby performance-based
covenants transfer control of the borrower to the lender in the event of poor financial
performance.

For this reason, performance-based covenants are used most often when a

borrower’s accounting information more reliably captures changes in credit risk. This study
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provides the interesting insight that borrowers appear to have negotiating power to trade-off
between different types of financial covenants. For example, borrowers that are financially
constrained may find capital-based covenants to be too costly, and so are able to avoid these
constraints by instead committing to performance-based covenants.
4. International Accounting Standards and Debt Contracting
International accounting standards have received considerable attention in equity markets
research. Early research examined the effects of voluntary adoption of International Accounting
Standards (IAS), while more recent studies have examined the effects of mandatory IFRS
adoption in the European Union, South Africa, and Australia, as well as the effects of accounting
standards enforcement and interpretation. However, relatively little research has examined the
effects of international accounting standards on debt contracting.
Ball, Li, and Shivakumar (2013) examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the
use of covenants in debt contracts. The authors find that in the post-mandatory IFRS adoption
period, borrowers in mandatory IFRS adopting countries experience loan contracts with fewer
accounting-based covenants but more non-accounting based covenants. The authors propose that
IFRS’s fair-value orientation introduces transitory shocks into earnings, and thus makes
accounting information less suitable for debt contracting. A key takeaway of this study is that
lenders substitute contracting mechanisms for borrowers based on the borrowers’ accounting
information.

The authors conclude that IFRS do not meet the demand for accounting

information which is reliable and informative for debt contracting purposes. This study also
expresses concern that IFRS fair-value numbers may open windows for earnings manipulation,
as fair-value estimates are inherently more subjective than historical cost.
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Another paper examining the effects of post-IFRS adoption on debt contracting is Chen,
Chin, Wang, and Yao (2013). Similar to the Ball et al. (2013) study, this study also looks at the
effects of post-IFRS adoption on debt contracting by examining a sample of firms from countries
that adopt IFRS and others that do not adopt. In this study, the authors examine a wider set of
loan characteristics, examining the loan spread, the accounting-based covenants, the maturity,
and the collateralization of the loan. They find evidence that in the post-IFRS period, borrowers
from mandatory IFRS adopting countries experience loan contracts with a higher credit spread,
fewer accounting-based covenants, greater likelihood of collateralization, and a shorter maturity.
They further find that these results are strongest for borrowers with more aggressive reporting of
accruals in the post-IFRS period, or increased income smoothing. The authors conclude that
IFRS introduced opportunities for earnings management, and therefore makes accounting
information less suitable for debt contracting.

Lenders compensate for the additional

information risk that accompanies IFRS numbers by relying less on accounting-based covenants,
and instead charging a higher credit spread, structuring a shorter maturity, and collateralizing
loans more often.
Finally, Florou and Kosi (2013) examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on
another aspect of debt contracting.

The authors examine whether borrowers domiciled in

mandatory IFRS adopting countries tend to alter their reliance on public vs. private debt in the
post-IFRS adoption period. They find evidence that borrowers in mandatory IFRS adopting
countries are more likely to issue public bonds than private debt in the post-IFRS adoption
period. The authors propose that the arm’s length transactions in public debt financing make this
market particularly reliant on publicly-available accounting information. Private debt, on the
other hand, involves private relationships between banks and borrowers, where privately
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transmitted information can substitute for high quality public financial reporting. The authors
propose that IFRS offers higher quality financial reporting and enhanced comparability. They
argue that this improvement in financial reporting quality and comparability will most benefit
public debt transactions. The authors also find that mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with
a decrease in public bond yields, but no significant change in private loan credit spreads. Again,
the authors conclude that publicly available accounting information is paramount to public debt,
while private debt tends to rely more on private relationships. This paper’s results lie in contract
to Chen, Chin, Wang, and Yao (2013), whose study concludes that private borrowers in fact
experience higher credit spreads in the post-IFRS adoption period. Finally, Florou and Kosi
(2013) focus on a subsample of mandatory-IFRS adopters which did not experience concurrent
institutional changes. They show that their results are robust to this subsample, which suggests
that the results they document may truly be attributable the prescribed accounting standards, and
not concurrent changes in regulation or enforcement.
5. Contributions and Conclusions
My study contributes to the literature on how variations in accounting information affect
its use for contracting purposes. The question of how accounting information is used for debt
contracting has long been of interest to accounting researchers, practitioners, and policy makers.
As summarized in this chapter, multiple studies have attempted to quantify the degree to which a
lender perceives a borrower’s accounting information as suitable for debt contracting. This may
be referred to as “accounting quality” or accounting with a high “debt contracting value”. What
is truly being studied is the degree to which the accounting information is “usable” for lenders
writing loan contracts. To study this research question, researchers must isolate a setting where
accounting differences exist – across borrowers, or among borrowers and lenders – and then test
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how these differences affect debt contracts. However, it can be difficult to identify settings in
which differences in accounting rules among contracting parties lead to explicit differences in
accounting information. For this reason, past research has often attempted to isolate crosssectional variation in properties of accounting numbers among firms subject to the same
accounting standards. For example, using a sample of firms that report in US GAAP, prior
studies identify properties of accounting numbers that make the accounting information more or
less transparent (Sufi, 2007; Graham et al., 2008) and thus more or less appropriate for debt
contracting (Ball et al., 2008; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012), and then examined how these
cross-sectional differences affect the terms of the firms’ debt contracts (e.g. credit spread,
syndicate structure, use of covenants). A study of this nature is therefore a joint test: first, that
cross-sectional variation in properties of borrowers’ accounting information reflects more or less
transparency, and second, that this transparency affects debt contracting. As I isolate a setting
where contracting parties are subject to different accounting rules, my study is a direct test of the
degree to which familiarity with accounting information affects debt contracting. My measure
also focuses on the users of accounting information (in this case, the banks), and the degree to
which they will be familiar with the borrower’s accounting information. Previous studies, on the
other hand, have relied on properties of accounting information, a firm output, and hypothesized
as to how this output will be perceived by the users. Finally, I take advantage of an exogenous
shock to the accounting system in order to isolate the debt contracting effects of prescribed
accounting standards. For this reason, my study contributes to the literature by quantifying the
degree to which a lender’s familiarity with a borrower’s accounting information affects the terms
of loan contracts and the structure of the syndicate.
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Chapter 2: Financial Reporting Differences and Debt Contracting
1. Introduction
Accounting researchers and regulators have long been interested in the effects of
accounting information on debt contracting. Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986) propose that a
firm is essentially a nexus of contracts, and that the primary role of accounting information is to
facilitate the formation and performance of those contracts. Despite the importance of the debt
contracting role of accounting, the effect of accounting information on debt contracts receives
relatively little attention in the accounting literature. I address this deficiency by examining the
relationship between financial reporting differences and the terms and structure of debt contracts.
Beatty (2008) posits that accounting information plays two direct roles in debt
contracting. First, accounting plays an ex ante contracting role. Before signing a contract, a
bank makes an initial assessment of a borrower’s credit risk. There is information asymmetry
between the bank and the borrower as the borrower has private information about its own credit
risk (Leland and Pyle, 1977).

Publicly available accounting information can reduce this

information asymmetry by helping the bank to make an assessment of credit risk. Therefore,
accounting information can best serve the ex ante contracting role to the extent that the bank is
familiar with the borrower’s accounting information and finds it to be useful for an assessment of
credit risk.
Second, accounting information plays an ex post direct contracting role. When the bank
and the borrower enter into a debt contract, the bank uses accounting information to write the
contract in the form of financial covenants. The bank wishes to monitor the borrower’s credit
risk over the life of the loan. Covenants help the bank to monitor the borrower either by
restricting borrower investing or financing activity or by transferring control of the borrower to

16

the lender in the event of deteriorating financial performance. For this reason, accounting-based
covenants can most effectively serve the ex post direct contracting role if the bank is familiar
with how the borrower’s accounting information reflects economic fundamentals. Therefore, for
accounting information to be most effective in each of these two debt contracting roles, the bank
must be familiar with the borrower’s accounting information and how the accounting numbers
reflects credit risk.
In this paper, I examine how a bank’s familiarity with a borrower’s accounting
information affects the terms of debt contracts and the structure of loan syndicates. I use
differences in local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) among banks and
borrowers domiciled in different countries as a proxy for how familiar a lending bank will be
with a borrower’s accounting information. Prior to mandatory IFRS adoption in the European
Union, Australia, and South Africa in 2005, there was significant variation across prescribed
local GAAP. I exploit this variation to measure the degree of differences between the GAAP of
country-pairs, based on the country of origin of the lending bank and the country of origin of the
borrowing firm (Bae et al., 2008).1 Applying the Bae et al. (2008) GAAP differences measure
within a sample of international private debt contracts offers a powerful setting in which explicit
differences in accounting standards between contracting parties can be systematically measured

1

For borrowing firms, I collect the actual accounting standards used to ensure that my borrowing firms are in fact
using local standards. I control for firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS. For banks, I assume that the bank’s country
of origin is reflective of the bank’s familiarity with local standards in that country. I acknowledge that it is possible
that some banks may be familiar with multiple sets of standards, e.g. if a German bank actually reports using US
GAAP, and lends to a US borrower, the bank may be equally familiar with US GAAP as with German GAAP. In
this case, assigning a GAAP Differences value equivalent to the differences between US and German GAAP would
mean assuming GAAP differences where they did not actually exist. However, this would bias against me finding
results. As GAAP differences are synonymous with a higher level of information asymmetry between the bank and
the borrower, this would be equivalent to assigning a higher value for information asymmetry between the bank and
the borrower than that which truly exists. This would make it more difficult for me to find a significant association
between loan contract terms and GAAP differences.
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and examined. I take advantage of this unique opportunity to test how differences in accounting
information among contracting parties affect the design of debt contracts.
Using a sample of international loans prior to mandatory IFRS adoption, I examine the
impact of international GAAP differences on four different aspects of loan agreements: the credit
spread and fees, the syndicate structure, the reliance on debt covenants, and the relative
importance of the different types of financial covenants. I find that a larger difference between
the GAAP of the lender and the GAAP of the borrower is associated with a higher credit spread
and fees. I also find that a larger difference between the GAAP of the lender and the GAAP of
the borrower is associated with a closer monitoring relationship between the borrower and
lender, which is characterized by fewer banks in the syndicate and the lead bank holding a larger
proportion of the loan. Next, I examine the use of financial covenants, which should capture
how banks directly use accounting information in loan contracts. I find that larger GAAP
differences decrease banks’ overall reliance on financial covenants as a debt contracting tool.
However, I also find that banks significantly alter the types of covenants they use. With larger
GAAP differences, banks tend to write loan contracts that rely more heavily on capital-based
covenants, which restrict levels of debt or set minimum levels for capital requirements. They
also tend to write loan contracts which rely less on performance-based covenants, which are
based upon earnings numbers.
One key concern with my analysis is that a test relying on a sample of international loans,
in which the borrower and lender are domiciled in different countries, may suffer from a selfselection bias. That is, there may be something unique about the nature of international loans
that makes them fundamentally different from domestic loans. This raises concerns that my
results may be particular to international lending and would not generalize to other parties
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writing debt contracts. In addition, GAAP differences among country pairs are not randomly
assigned. Accounting principles arise over time as a result of country-specific pressures and
forces and are likely correlated with a country’s culture, legal system, or stage of development.
The ensuing endogeneity problem raises concerns that my results may not be attributable to
prescribed accounting standards, but rather to omitted correlated country-specific variables.
To mitigate these issues, I add international loans in the post-mandatory IFRS adoption
period to my sample. The mandatory adoption of IFRS offers an exogenous shock to the
accounting system at the firm level whereby, in the post-IFRS period, the differences in
prescribed accounting standards across countries are nonexistent (among IFRS users, in theory)
or significantly reduced (between IFRS users and US GAAP users), while other country-level
differences and lending incentives remain.2 I take advantage of this exogenous shock to the
global accounting system in order to capture the effects on loan contracting attributable solely to
differences in prescribed accounting standards.
The Bae et al. (2008) GAAP differences measure is designed to measure levels of
differences in prescribed accounting standards under local GAAP. I propose that, in the postIFRS period, this measure should capture national differences in accounting that persist as a
result of differences in prior local GAAP. After mandatory IFRS adoption, certain elements of
the accounting culture should not change simply due to a sudden change in prescribed
accounting standards. Financial reports are also a product of managerial reporting incentives,
which are unlikely to change with new accounting standards (Burgstahler et al., 2006). In
addition, recent studies of post-IFRS financial reports suggest that when IFRS users face
2

I control for concurrent changes in legal enforcement to the extent possible using the Kaufmann et al. (2009) rule
of law index. I acknowledge that this index may not fully capture all concurrent changes in enforcement and
interpretation (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, 2013). In a sensitivity test to address concerns about concurrent changes
in country-level characteristics, I find that my results are robust to shortening the window around mandatory IFRS
adoption to only a few years before and after.
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accounting options, they tend to select accounting policies which retain prior national GAAP
treatments (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013). Differences in how each country implements IFRS
are strongly correlated with each country’s accounting treatment under their (prior) local GAAP
(KPMG and von Keitz, 2006; European Commision, 2008; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Kvaal and
Nobes, 2012; Haller and Wehrfritz, 2013). The GAAP differences measure in the post-IFRS
period should therefore capture residual differences in accounting that persist as a result of
differences in national GAAP prior to IFRS. The change in the effect of GAAP differences on
loan contract terms from the pre- to the post-IFRS periods should thus capture the amount of the
effect attributable solely to differences in prescribed standards.
In my analyses including the post-IFRS periods, I find that a significant portion of the
effect of GAAP differences on debt contracting terms disappears in the post-IFRS period3.
Isolating the portion of the effect that goes away in the post-IFRS period, I find that greater
differences in prescribed accounting standards between the borrower and the lender are
associated with a larger credit spread and higher fees, a more concentrated loan syndicate, and a
substitution of capital-based covenants for performance-based covenants. In my test of reliance
on financial covenants, consistent with Ball et al. (2013), I document that banks tend to rely less
on financial covenants as a contracting tool in the post-IFRS period. In addition, I document that
while banks tend to rely less on financial covenants when contracting with borrowers with
significantly different local accounting systems, the effect largely disappears in the post-IFRS
period.4

3

In this analysis, the effect is measured as the difference between the pre- and post-IFRS periods of the effect of
GAAP differences on loan contract terms. In other words, it is the amount of the effect of GAAP differences on
loan contract terms that “disappears” after mandatory IFRS adoption.
4
While the coefficient on the interaction term is not significant, I find that the sum of the coefficients on GAAP
Differences and GAAP Differences*Post-IFRS is insignificantly different from zero. I conclude that this effect
largely disappears in the post-IFRS period.
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My results are consistent with banks experiencing greater information problems when
contracting with parties whose accounting information they find less familiar, and therefore
harder to understand and interpret. I find that banks compensate for these information problems
by charging additional interest and fees, monitoring more carefully through their relationship
with the borrower, and restricting the borrower’s activities through capital-based requirements.
Banks also respond to these information problems by relying less heavily on all financial
covenants, and in particular earnings-based covenants. My results suggest that differences in
accounting standards impose costs on debt markets. My results also provide new insights and
evidence regarding the reliance on covenants in the presence of accounting differences, which, to
my knowledge, no prior research has shown. Most importantly, this setting provides a unique
opportunity to shed new light on the more general question about how variation in users’
familiarity with accounting information affects how parties write debt contracts.
This study contributes to the literature on how variation in accounting information affects
debt contracting. As it can be difficult to identify settings in which contracting parties have
explicit differences in accounting information, prior studies of the relationship between
accounting information and debt contracting effectively constitute a joint test: isolating crosssectional variations in observable properties of accounting numbers among firms subject to the
same accounting standards, and then testing how this cross-sectional variation affects loan
contracting. As I isolate a setting where contracting parties are subject to different accounting
standards, my study is a direct and powerful test of the degree to which a user’s familiarity with
accounting information affects debt contracting. My measure also focuses on the users of
accounting information (in this case, lenders), and the degree to which they are familiar with a
borrower’s accounting information. Previous studies, on the other hand, rely on one or more
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properties of accounting information (e.g. the significance of lagged earnings in a model of the
prediction of credit ratings changes), and hypothesize how this empirical feature of an output of a
firm’s accounting system will affect lenders.
As debt contracting is one of the key economic roles of accounting information (Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986), understanding how international differences in accounting standards
affect debt contracting is critical. In addition, private debt represents an important source of firm
financing, with issuances totaling US$37.8 trillion worldwide since 2000.5 Despite the economic
importance of this market, and the explicit reliance of debt contracting on accounting
information, relatively little research has examined how differences in accounting standards
across countries affect debt contracting. Ball et al. (2013) provide evidence that the postmandatory IFRS adoption period is associated with a decrease in the reliance on financial
covenants. My results are consistent with and complement their findings by providing unique
evidence that contracting across jurisdictions subject to differing accounting standards is
associated with a lower reliance on financial covenants and a substitution of capital- for
performance-based covenants.
This study also contributes to the international accounting literature by providing
evidence of the economic costs of contracting across different jurisdictions, consistent with the
idea that local accounting standards evolve to facilitate contracting in a particular geographical
area (Schipper, 2005; Ball, 2006). This evidence is very relevant to a post-IFRS world. In spite
of widespread adoption of IFRS in the European Union and multiple other countries, studies of
post-IFRS financial statements have documented significant country-level differences in the
implementation and enforcement of IFRS which persist and prevent full comparability across
countries. These differences tend to be highly correlated with the prior local GAAP (Kvaal and
5

Total issuances per DealScan from 2000 – 2012.
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Nobes, 2010; Kvaal and Nobes, 2012; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013; Haller and Wehrfritz,
2013). For this reason, evidence of how local GAAP differences affect debt contracting is
relevant to post-IFRS debt contracting.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.

Section 2 provides institutional

background and literature review. Section 3 develops my hypotheses. Section 4 provides my
research design and section 5 discuses data. Finally, section 6 discusses my main results, section
7 presents additional analyses, and section 8 concludes.
2. Institutional Background and Literature Review
2.1 Institutional Background and Literature Review - Private Loans
In private bank loans, one or more banks contract directly with the borrowing firm to
establish the terms of the loan. In bilateral loans, a single bank contracts directly with the
borrower to establish the amount of the loan and the terms, including the maturity, the credit
spread, and the covenants. The lending bank makes an assessment of the borrower’s credit risk,
based in part on the borrowing firm’s publicly available accounting information. The lending
bank also forms a private relationship with the borrower, to facilitate the transfer of private
information and the monitoring of borrower activities over the life of the loan.
In the syndicated loan market (loans involving a syndicate of two or more lending banks),
one or more bank acts as the lead arranger (or “lead bank”) and works with the borrower to
establish the terms of the loan in a preliminary loan agreement. The preliminary loan agreement
is signed when the lead bank and the borrower agree on the major terms of the loan: the loan
amount, maturity, debt covenants, and a range for the credit spread. Subsequent to signing the
preliminary loan agreement, the lead bank will seek out other banks to participate in the
syndicate. The non-lead (“participant”) banks must also approve the terms of the loan, and have
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the power to propose changes to the preliminary loan agreement before agreeing to participate in
the syndicate. The final loan contract is signed when all syndicate members have agreed upon
the terms of the loan contract and the lead bank has established the structure of the syndicate,
including the number of participant banks involved and the amount of the loan each bank will
hold.
Theory proposes that information asymmetries among different contracting parties will
affect the terms of the loan and the design of an optimal contract. Information asymmetry in
private bank loans exists between the borrower and the lender as the borrower has private
information about its own credit risk. Information asymmetry between the borrower and the
lender demands that the lender perform the due diligence required to assess the borrower’s credit
quality prior to signing the loan contract. In addition, this type of information asymmetry
requires that the lender monitor the borrower throughout the life of the loan. In bilateral loans,
the lending bank is responsible for the monitoring and due diligence efforts. In syndicated loans,
the monitoring and due diligence efforts are delegated to the lead bank(s). This allows one or
more banks to take more responsibility for due diligence and monitoring by forming a
relationship with the borrower (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Holmstrom, 1982; Diamond, 1984). The
lead bank then uses that relationship to gain access to private information about the borrower and
to monitor the borrower. The amount of due diligence and monitoring required depends on the
degree of information asymmetry between the borrower and the lending bank(s).
One of the factors affecting this information asymmetry is the borrower’s accounting
information. Accounting information can help relieve agency problems by reducing information
asymmetries when banks are able to understand and trust the degree to which the accounting
information reflects underlying credit risk. The reverse is also true: consistent with greater
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information asymmetry, less transparent borrowers generally face stricter loan terms. Diamond
and Verrecchia’s (1991) theory suggests that information transparency (through additional
disclosures) can reduce a firm’s cost of capital, while Bharath et al. (2008) find that borrowers
with poorer accounting quality (measured using unsigned abnormal operating accruals)
experience higher credit spreads. Graham et al. (2008) find that firms with recent accounting
restatements experience more restrictive loan contract terms, including higher credit spreads and
more financial covenants. They attribute these more stringent terms to banks experiencing
uncertainty with respect to a borrower’s financial reporting following a restatement. Nikolaev
(2010) finds that lenders are more likely to use debt covenants when a borrower has more timely
loss recognition. More timely loss recognition may be beneficial to lenders relying on earningsbased covenants, as the lenders can trust that earnings will provide a timelier signal of
deterioration in credit quality. These results suggest that lenders are more likely to use financial
covenants when they are familiar with the degree to which a borrower’s accounting information
transparently reflects changes in credit risk. Lowery and Wardlaw (2011) suggest that some
types of earnings-based covenants are used more often with more repeat lending between the
lender and the borrower. This suggests that better bank monitoring makes earnings-based
covenants more valuable. Finally, Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) find that banks are more
likely to use earnings-based covenants than capital-based covenants when a borrower’s
accounting information more reliably captures changes in credit risk.
For syndicated loans, theory suggests that banks may address information asymmetries
and agency problems through the structure of the syndicate, for example, by requiring the lead
bank to hold a relatively larger share of the loan when there is a greater potential for adverse
selection or moral hazard (Leland and Pyle, 1977). This ensures that the lead bank has a
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sufficient stake in the loan to provide incentives for due diligence and monitoring. Sufi (2007)
finds that firms with more opaque information environments (as measured by the availability of
credit ratings and SEC filings) have loans with a more concentrated syndicate structure, where
the lead bank holds a greater proportion of the loan and fewer banks are involved in the
syndicate. Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) find that banks form more concentrated loan
syndicates when borrowers’ accounting information is less useful for predicting future
deterioration in credit quality.

They propose that the lead bank’s monitoring through a

relationship with the borrower may serve as an alternative to monitoring through accountingbased debt covenants.

If this is true, banks should trade off monitoring through a closer

relationship with the borrower and relying more heavily on financial covenants. Therefore,
banks will form a more concentrated syndicate when contracting with debt covenants is more
difficult.
2.2 Literature Review – International Accounting Standards and Debt Markets
Despite widespread interest in international accounting standards, relatively little research
has focused on the effects of variation in accounting standards across countries on the debt
markets. Ball et al. (2013) document a decrease in the use of financial covenants and an increase
in the use of non-financial covenants in IFRS-adopting countries following mandatory IFRS
adoption. The authors conclude that IFRS’s fair-value orientation makes it less suitable for longterm debt contracting. Chen et al. (2013) find that following mandatory IFRS adoption, loans for
borrowers domiciled in mandatory IFRS-adopting countries are associated with a greater credit
spread and a reduction in the use of financial covenants. The authors conclude that IFRS’s
principles-based approach to accounting standards makes accounting numbers less reliable for
debt contracting and increases the probability of earnings management. Finally, Florou and Kosi
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(2013) examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on borrowers’ choice between private
and public debt. They find that mandatory IFRS adopters are more likely to issue public debt
than private debt after mandatory IFRS adoption.

They conclude that private debt relies

primarily on private communication between borrowers and lenders, and thus should not be
substantially affected by differences in accounting information.
Studies that examine the relationship between international accounting standards and debt
contracting have generally focused on the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on features of
debt contracts.

In contrast, this paper examines the effects of differences in accounting

information on debt contracting, and simply exploits pre-IFRS differences in accounting
standards as a powerful setting to test this research question. Mandatory IFRS adoption serves as
an exogenous shock at the firm level in my setting.

This additional analysis addresses

endogeneity problems due to the self-selection bias in my sample and the correlation between a
country’s accounting standards and other country-specific factors. By examining the differences
in effects from the pre- to post-IFRS periods, I am therefore able to isolate the effect that is truly
attributable to prescribed differences in accounting standards.
3. Research Question and Hypothesis Development
3.1 Credit Spread and Fees
Perhaps the most direct measure of costs to borrowing firms are the fees and credit spread
paid to the lending (lead) bank. The credit spread and fees in a loan are typically modeled as a
function of borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, the nature of the relationship with the
lending bank, and macroeconomic factors (Bharath et al, 2011). In addition, when examining
international loans, it is important to control for country-specific factors such as the strength of
enforcement and the legal system (Esty and Megginson, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and
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Goyal, 2009). Each of these factors is intended to capture some element of the borrower’s credit
risk.
If differences in accounting standards increase information asymmetries by affecting a
bank’s ability to perceive how accounting numbers reflect credit risk, we may expect that larger
GAAP differences between the borrower and the lending bank will be associated with higher
fees and higher credit spreads. The lending bank (or the lead bank(s), in a syndicated loan)
determines the credit spread based on the perceived credit risk of the borrower, or the risk that
the borrower will not be able to repay the loan. Banks will use tighter loan contract terms, such
as a higher spread, to price protect for information risk associated with information asymmetry.
Graham et al. (2008) provide evidence that banks write loan contracts with higher credit spreads
following accounting restatements, when banks face greater uncertainty about the quality of a
borrower’s accounting information. However, restating firms are likely different from nonrestating firms, and likely have a different credit risk profile than non-restating firms. The
bank’s familiarity with the borrower’s accounting standards should directly affect the degree to
which the bank is able to make an assessment of credit risk based on the borrower’s publicly
available accounting information. If the bank faces greater information asymmetry due to a lack
of familiarity with the borrower’s accounting information, it will price protect against this
information risk via a higher credit spread. The fees paid to the lending (lead) bank are also
determined by the degree of effort required to make an assessment of credit risk.

If the

borrower’s accounting standards are significantly different from those in the lending bank’s
country of origin, the bank may charge higher fees and a higher credit spread to compensate for
their reduced ability to understand how the firm’s accounting numbers map into its credit risk,
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and for the additional effort and risk they assume in order to understand the borrower’s
accounting information and credit risk.
Alternatively, it is also possible that GAAP differences between the borrower and the
lending bank have no effect on fees and credit spreads. Banks are sophisticated users of
financial statements. It is possible that they are able to overcome differences in how different
accounting standards reflect credit risk without significant effort. In addition, prior studies
emphasize the importance of private relationships and monitoring among contracting parties in
private bank loans. Florou and Kosi (2013) find no effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on credit
spreads in syndicated bank loans and conclude that a change in accounting standards does not
affect private debt markets as these markets rely primarily on private monitoring and not on
publicly disclosed information. It is possible that if lending banks rely significantly on private
monitoring and private information in assessing borrower credit risk, publicly available
accounting information would not significantly affect the information asymmetry with the
borrower. If there is no significant association between differences in accounting standards and
fees and credit spreads this would provide evidence that banks do not experience information
problems when lending to borrowers who use different accounting standards.
My first hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as follows:
H1:

A larger GAAP difference between the bank and borrower is associated with a
higher credit spread and higher fees.

3.2 Syndicate Structure
In syndicated loans, the lead bank establishes a relationship with the borrower which
facilitates monitoring and the exchange of private information and which gives the bank greater
insight into the borrower’s creditworthiness. The lead bank can lessen the effects of information
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asymmetries with the borrower by forming a more concentrated syndicate, providing incentives
to monitor the borrower more carefully. A more concentrated syndicate is typically identified by
a smaller number of banks in the syndicate and a syndicate in which the lead bank holds a greater
proportion of the loan.
When borrowers use accounting standards that are significantly different from the lead
bank’s local standards, banks may find it difficult to understand how the borrower’s accounting
information reflects underlying credit risk.

As a result, banks may rely more heavily on

monitoring through their private relationship with the borrower. If banks are unfamiliar with a
borrower’s accounting standards, they may perceive the borrower to be a greater information risk
and in greater need of monitoring. If this is the case, we would expect that larger GAAP
differences between the borrower and the lead bank’s home country will be associated with a
more concentrated lending syndicate.
My second hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as follows:
H2:

A larger GAAP difference between the bank and borrower is associated with a
more concentrated lending syndicate.

3.3 Financial Covenants
3.3.1 Reliance on Financial Covenants
Banks write loan contracts using financial (accounting-based) covenants in order to
overcome the conflicts of interest inherent to the borrower-lender relationship. Covenants may
help align the interests of a borrower and lender by helping to control agency problems (Smith
and Warner, 1979) or by acting as trip wires that transfer control of the borrowing firm to the
lender if specific performance measures are not upheld (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012). While
past research has identified determinants of the use of financial covenants in private debt
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contracts, including legal regimes and the level of enforcement of creditor rights in the
borrower’s country of origin, to my knowledge no prior research has established a link between
the use of financial covenants in debt contracts and differences in local accounting standards.
The direction of the relationship between the use of financial covenants and differences
in accounting standards is not clear. On one hand, we may expect that banks are less likely to
use financial covenants when dealing with borrowers whose accounting standards are
significantly different from their own. Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) propose that when
accounting information is a poor predictor of changes in credit quality, banks form a more
concentrated syndicate in order to monitor the borrower more carefully as their ability to contract
directly through debt covenants will be impaired. Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011)
document that borrowers with internal control weaknesses have debt contracts with lower
reliance on accounting-based debt covenants. The authors interpret that when a borrower has
internal control weaknesses, the bank will not wish to rely on the borrower’s accounting
information and will rely more heavily on contracting tools that don’t use accounting
information. If banks are unfamiliar with a borrower’s accounting information, they may not
wish to use debt contracting tools which require a reliance on accounting information.
Therefore, banks may rely less on financial covenants when contracting with borrowers whose
accounting standards are significantly different from their own.
However, it is also possible that a lack of familiarity with a borrower’s accounting
information will make banks more likely to use financial covenants. Bradley and Roberts (2004)
find that smaller firms and firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely to have
financial covenants included in their loan agreements. This is consistent with banks being more
likely to include financial covenants in loan agreements when a borrower’s accounting
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information is less reliable. Graham et al. (2008) find that following accounting restatements,
banks experience greater information asymmetry as a result of uncertainty about a borrower’s
financial reporting. They find that banks overcome this information asymmetry by using more
restrictive loan terms, including more financial covenant restrictions. A pivotal conclusion of
Graham et al.’s (2008) study is that covenants are used more often when borrowers require more
monitoring. Therefore, it is possible that banks perceive financial covenants as simply another
element of restrictive loan contracts, not necessarily one which requires a sophisticated
understanding of a borrower’s accounting information. Therefore, we might expect that banks
will write contracts using more financial covenants when a borrower’s accounting information is
perceived to be less familiar.
Finally, it is possible that larger GAAP differences are not associated with a greater or
lesser reliance on financial covenants. Banks may be sufficiently sophisticated to be able to
adjust any loan covenants for the potential effects of GAAP differences.

Alternatively, as

discussed in the following section, it is possible that banks react to differences in accounting
standards by changing the types of financial covenants they use, and not by increasing or
decreasing their overall use of covenants. As the relationship between GAAP differences and
the reliance on financial covenants is unclear, I state my third hypothesis in null form:
H3:

There is no significant association between the GAAP difference between the
bank and borrower and the reliance on financial covenants in the loan contract.

3.3.2 Types of Financial Covenants
In addition to the degree to which lending banks rely on financial covenants, we can
analyze the types of covenants used in loan contracts. Banks may respond to a lack of familiarity
with the borrower’s GAAP by altering the package of financial covenants they write into the
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contract. Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) identify two main types of financial covenants:
performance-based covenants, which include measures of performance such as net income or
EBIT, and capital-based covenants, which restrict levels of debt or set minimum requirements
for working capital. Performance-based covenants are forward-looking and act as “trip wires”,
allocating control of the borrower to the lender in the event of poor performance. Capital-based
covenants, on the other hand, align debt holder-shareholder interests by requiring the borrowing
firm to maintain minimum levels of capital. As performance-based covenants allocate control of
the borrowing firm to the lender if firm performance falls below a threshold, these types of
covenants require earnings to provide a timely signal of the deterioration of firm performance. If
earnings do not reflect deteriorating firm performance in a timely manner, then a performancebased covenant will be inefficient and costly to the lender. Capital-based covenants restrict debt
or set minimum levels of working capital, and are thus based on cumulative balance sheet
information. If earnings are a noisy signal of credit quality (or if earnings management is
severe), these fluctuations tend to reverse over time. Noise in earnings should thus have less of
an effect on covenants based upon cumulative balance sheet information. Christensen and
Nikolaev (2012) find that loan contracts rely more heavily on performance-based covenants than
capital-based covenants when the borrower’s accounting information is a better predictor of
deterioration in credit quality. If the lending bank is unfamiliar with a borrower’s accounting
standards, they may be unable to attest to the timeliness of earnings with respect to changes in
credit risk. The bank may be unwilling to rely on a contracting mechanism which requires
timely earnings if they lack familiarity with the borrower’s accounting standards and the degree
to which those accounting standards result in timely earnings. Therefore, when there are larger
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differences between the GAAP of the lender and the GAAP of the borrower, banks may rely
more heavily on capital-based covenants and less heavily on performance-based covenants.
However, Lowery and Wardlaw (2011) find that debt-to-cash-flow based covenants (one
type of performance-based covenants) are used more often with repeat lending between the
lender and the borrower, which suggests that as a bank learns more about a borrower, earningsbased covenants become more valuable. This suggests that performance-based covenants may
be used more often in conjunction with a greater degree of monitoring by the lending bank.
Therefore, if banks monitor borrowers with unfamiliar accounting information more closely, we
may expect that they will rely more heavily on performance-based covenants. As the direction
of the relationship between GAAP differences between the borrower and the lender and the types
of covenants used in the loan contract is unclear, I state my fourth hypothesis in null form:
H4:

There is no significant association between the GAAP difference between the
bank and borrower and the reliance on capital-based vs. performance-based
covenants.

4. Research Design
In examining the effects of GAAP differences on loan contract terms and syndicate
structure, I run the following OLS regression, using as a dependent variable the contract term or
the property of the syndicate structure being tested in each hypothesis:
Contract/Syndicate characteristic = α1 + α2GAAP Differences + α3Borrower
Characteristics +

α4Loan Characteristics + α5Country Characteristics + α6Year

Dummy Variable +

α7Industry Dummy Variable + ε

4.1 Contract/Syndicate charateristics:
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To test H1 I use the dependent variable Log Spread, the log of All in Spread, which
captures all fees and credit spreads, measured as the basis point spread over LIBOR on the loan
initiation date. To test H2, I use two different dependent variables. I first use Number of
Lenders, defined as the total number of banks in the loan syndicate. I next use Percent Held
Lead, defined as the percentage of the loan held by the lead bank in the loan syndicate. In loan
observations with more than one lead bank, this variable represents the average percentage of the
loan held by all lead banks (Sufi, 2007; Ball et al., 2008).6 Both of the variables used to test H2
are measures of the degree of concentration of a loan syndicate. A more concentrated syndicate
is characterized by fewer lenders and the lead bank holding a larger percentage of the loan, and is
consistent with a closer monitoring relationship between the bank and the borrower.
To test H3 and H4 I use measures of the financial covenants in the loan contract. In
these analyses, I eliminate observations for which DealScan does not provide covenant data.
DealScan’s data on covenants is missing for a substantial portion of loan observations. As it is
unlikely that these loan contracts are all written without financial covenants, I elect to drop these
observations, rather than set their covenant variables equal to zero (Christensen and Nikolaev,
2012). For H3, the test of overall reliance on financial covenants, I run a regression with the
dependent variable Financial Covenants, which counts the number of financial covenants
included in the loan contract. For H4, the test of the types of covenants included in the loan
contract, I use measures of performance- and capital-based covenants. The variable P-covenants
measures the number of performance-based or “P-covenants” included in the loan contract.
These are covenants that include measures of performance or earnings, including the fixedcharge coverage ratio, debt service coverage ratio, interest coverage ratio and cash interest

6

In bilateral loans the Number of Lenders is equal to 1, and the Percentage Held Lead is equal to 100, as a single
bank holds the entire amount of the loan. My results are robust to the exclusion of bilateral loans from this analysis.
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coverage ratio, and ratios of debt or senior debt to EBITDA. The variable C-covenants measures
the number of capital-based or “C-covenants” included in the loan contract. These are covenants
which require a borrower to maintain minimum levels of capital or restrict maximum levels of
debt, including the leverage ratio, debt-to-tangible net worth ratio, debt-equity ratio, current
ratio, and minimum levels of net worth or tangible net worth. Finally the P-ratio measures the
ratio of performance-to-total financial covenants included in the loan contract, or Pcovenants/(P-covenants + C-covenants). This should capture the relative degree to which a
contract relies on P-covenants versus C-covenants (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012).
4.2 GAAP Differences
In order to capture the degree of differences between the accounting standards used by
the borrower and the accounting standards used by the lender, I use Bae, Tan, and Welker’s
(2008) measure, gaapdiff1 (GAAP Differences).

To calculate this measure, I define each

borrowing firm’s country of origin, and ensure that the firm uses the local accounting standards
in that country in the pre-IFRS period (i.e., controlling for voluntary IFRS adopters). 7 I then
define the country of origin of the bank (or lead bank, for syndicated loans). I assume that a
bank’s country of origin should proxy for the bank’s familiarity with the local standards in that
country, and lack of familiarity with other standards. However, as explained earlier, to the extent
that this may not be the case for some banks, I would be applying GAAP differences where truly
none exist. This would make it more difficult for me to find a significant association between
GAAP differences in loan contract terms, and would thus bias against my finding results. For
each borrower-lender country pair, the GAAP Differences measure is defined as in Bae, Tan, and
Welker (2008), where each country is assigned values for each of 21 different key accounting

7

For a handful of observations where the borrowing firm reports using US GAAP (and is not a US firm), I code this
firm as if it were a US firm.
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items (from GAAP 2001: A Survey of National Accounting Rules Benchmarked Against
International Accounting Standards, Nobes, 2001), and whether their treatment of this
accounting item differs or not from IAS. Then, for each country pair, I add up the total number
of differences between their treatments of the 21 different items. The values range from a
minimum of 0 GAAP differences, between Ireland and the UK, to a maximum of 17 GAAP
differences between Luxembourg and the UK. In addition, a substantial number of observations
have more than one lead bank (46% of my sample). In the calculation of the GAAP Differences
variable, when there is more than one lead bank, I use the smallest of the GAAP Differences
measures for all of the lead banks (Giannetti and Yafeh, 2011). This measure is conservative as
it assumes that the bank with the fewest number of GAAP differences with the borrower will be
able to monitor borrowers most effectively, thus compensating for the larger number of
differences that the other lead banks may have with the borrower. This will be the case if this
lead bank is able to capitalize on its relative familiarity with the borrower’s accounting
information and express this familiarity to other lead banks. In cases where there is only a single
lender or a single lead bank, or if all lead banks are domiciled in the same country, the GAAP
Differences variable is simply equal to the number of GAAP differences between the lender
(lead) and the borrower.
4.3 Borrower Characteristics
The terms of loan contracts and the syndicate structure are largely determined by
characteristics of borrower risk, including borrower size, profitability, leverage, the collateral
value of assets, and growth opportunities. Studies examining the determinants of loan contract
terms and syndicate structure use a variety of variables to control for these properties of
borrower risk. To study a set of international borrowers domiciled in 43 different countries, I
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adopt the firm control variables used by Bae and Goyal (2009) and Costello and WittenbergMoerman (2011). Larger firms are more mature and often better diversified, so they will have a
lower default risk. To control for borrower size I use LN Assets, the natural log of total assets (in
US$) at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the loan contract is signed. Profitability
should affect loan contract terms and syndicate structure as profitable firms have a lower default
risk. I measure profitability as the return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of operating
income to total assets (in US$) at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the loan contract is
signed. It is also important to control for a borrower’s leverage, as more highly levered firms are
inherently riskier, and will experience greater difficulty in paying back the new debt being
issued. More highly levered firms are also more likely to underinvest if shareholders perceive
that creditors claim a substantial portion of the firms’ returns (Myers, 1977). Leverage is defined
as total debt divided by total assets (in US$) at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the
loan contract is signed. I also control for the tangibility of assets, as tangible assets will be easier
to collateralize and potentially hold greater liquidation value in the event of distress (Bae and
Goyal, 2009). Tangibility is defined as the ratio of PP&E to total assets (in US$) at the end of
the most recent fiscal year before the loan contract is signed. Finally, I control for growth
opportunities with the market-to-book ratio of assets. Agency theory argues that growth firms
will tend to have higher contracting costs. These firms are inherently riskier and they lose a
greater amount of their value in distress. The market-to-book value of assets (MTB Assets) is
defined as the market value of assets (total assets less book value of equity plus market value of
common equity) divided by total assets (in US$) at the end of the most recent fiscal year before
the loan contract is signed. Finally, I control for two more non-financial firm characteristics.
Voluntary IFRS is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm uses IFRS instead
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of local GAAP in the financial statements at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the loan
contract is signed.8 Past Relation controls for the proximity of the past relationship between the
borrower and the lending bank (or lead bank for syndicated loans). Banks that have had multiple
previous loans with a borrower will likely have a better understanding of the borrower’s financial
statements and operations, and may require less additional monitoring and due diligence going
forward. A closer relationship between the bank and borrower will thus be associated with lower
information asymmetry between the bank and the borrower (Bharath et al., 2011) and should be
associated with a greater reliance on financial covenants, as the lender has gained a better
understanding of the borrower’s financial statements during past lending relationships, and thus
finds it easier to contract based on the borrower’s financial statements. The variable is defined
as the number of private loans initiated by the borrowing firm in the past five years (with respect
to the loan tranche) which were made with the same bank (lead bank) divided by the total
number of private loans initiated by the borrowing firm in the past five years. Calculating the
Past Relation variable in this way allows the variable to capture the strength of the borrowerlender relationship with respect to total borrowing activity, and allows the measure to be
comparable among borrowers with different degrees of borrowing activity (Bharath et al., 2011;
Chen et al., 2013). Finally, as a large percentage of my loans come from US borrowers, I control
for US firms using US-dummy, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the borrower is a
US-based firm (Esty and Megginson, 2003; Hong et al., 2011).
4.4 Loan Characteristics
I control for several loan characteristics which likely affect the terms of the loan contract

8

These firms are still coded for GAAP Differences by their country of origin. The Voluntary IFRS variable should
control for the effect of voluntary IFRS adoption on loan contract terms and syndicate structure. However, there are
very few voluntary adopters in my sample (only 100 loan observations) and my results are robust to the exclusion of
these observations.
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and the syndicate structure. Term Loan Indicator is an indicator variable which takes the value
of 1 if the loan is a term loan, and zero otherwise. I create several indicator variables to capture
the primary purpose of the loan proceeds: working capital, backup, refinancing, acquisitions, and
other. Performance Pricing Indicator is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the
loan contract includes performance pricing, and zero otherwise. LN Tranche Amount is equal to
the natural log of the loan tranche amount (in $US). LN Maturity is equal to the natural log of
the maturity (in months). All in Spread controls for the credit spread and fees.9 Finally, Secured
and Senior are indicator variables taking the value of 1 if the loan is secured or senior,
respectively, and 0 otherwise.
4.5 Country Characteristics
As I am examining a sample of loans from firms based in different countries, it is
important to control for country-specific characteristics which may influence the terms of loan
contracts or the syndicate structure. LN GDP is the natural log of annual GDP per capita for the
borrower’s country. GDP per capita should control for the level of economic development in the
country in which the borrower is domiciled. It is important to control for GDP per capita as
greater economic development is often correlated with political stability, and hence, more lenient
contract terms. LN Sovereign Rating is the natural log of the country-level sovereign risk rating
(from Fitch), transformed to an ordinal scale so that smaller numbers represent the least risky
ratings. The sovereign risk rating should control for the level of country risk, and should
likewise be correlated with political and economic stability. Finally, Rule of Law is a countryyear-level measure of the quality of a country’s legal and enforcement environment from

9

This control variable is only included for the test of H2-H4. For my other tests, following prior literature, I do not
include in each test the loan/syndicate characteristics not being tested (e.g., in the test of the determinants of
syndicate structure (H2), I do not include the financial covenants). However, my results are robust to the inclusion
of these other loan/syndicate characteristics as control variables in each test.
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Kaufmann et al. (2009). This measure should control for the quality of a country’s enforcement
environment (Byard et al., 2011), where higher scores equate to a greater quality enforcement
environment. The quality of the enforcement environment in the borrower’s country should
affect the lender’s perception of borrower risk, as it is a proxy for how strictly debt contracts can
be enforced, and is thus correlated with the likelihood of the lender being repaid in the event of
bankruptcy. Stronger legal enforcement is often associated with lower rates of interest and a
greater reliance on financial covenants. It is also typically associated with a more concentrated
loan syndicate, as lenders will likely be most willing to monitor borrowers when they believe the
borrower’s country of origin will effectively enforce their creditor rights in the event of
bankruptcy (Esty and Megginson, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Hong et
al., 2011).10,11
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.1 Data Sources
I collect bank loan data from the Dealscan database of Thomson Reuters’ Loan Pricing
Corporation. For my primary (pre-mandatory IFRS adoption) analysis, I start with all loans
issued from 2000 to 2005. As many loan and syndicate characteristics vary across tranches of
the same loan deals, I perform my analysis at the tranche level, treating each tranche as a
separate observation (Esty and Megginson, 2003). I collect the borrower’s and lender’s (lead
10

Esty and Megginson (2003), Qian and Strahan (2007), and Bae and Goyal (2009) emphasize that it is the
borrower’s country of origin that matters for legal enforcement, as this is the country where funds will be located
and creditor rights will be enforced in the event of bankruptcy. Many syndicated loans contain a “choice of law”
clause that allows for the enforcement of the loan contract under US or UK law, which would tend to attenuate the
effects of the strength of the legal system on loan contract and syndicate structure terms. In addition, the choice of
law clause affects the enforcement of the loan contract, and not the enforcement of property rights under bankruptcy.
11
I rely on the Kaufmann et al. (2009) measure of legal enforcement as it provides a score for each country-year,
and is updated to more recent years than alternate measures. My results are robust to controlling for different
measures of the strength of legal enforcement, including the following: International Country Risk Guide’s property
rights measure, which combines measures of corruption, risk of repudiation, and risk of expropriation of private
investment (Bae and Goyal, 2009); LaPorta et al.’s (1998) measure of creditor rights (Esty and Megginson, 2003,
Qian and Strahan, 2007); and LaPorta et al.’s (1998) measure of the rule of law (Hong et al., 2011).
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bank’s) country of origin for each loan observation. This enables me to isolate international
loans, where the borrower and the lending bank (or lead bank) are domiciled in different
countries. I eliminate all domestic loan observations, where the borrower and the lending (lead)
bank are domiciled in the same country. I collect the GAAP Differences variable from the
information given in Table 1 of Bae et al. (2008), eliminating any loans originating from
borrowers or lenders not domiciled in one of the 49 countries covered by Bae et al. (2008).
Dealscan also provides data for my dependent variables: credit spread, the number and types of
covenants used, and the number of banks in the loan syndicate. Data on the percentage of the
loan held by each bank in the syndicate is available for about half (49%) of my sample. Multiple
loan observations are missing data for the variable which captures the credit spread and fees (all
in spread drawn, in Dealscan), so, consistent with prior studies, I do not require the loan
observations to have data about credit spread for tests of H2 – H4.12 Finally, Dealscan provides
data for the loan characteristics included as control variables, including the tranche amount
(converted to US$ for loans in international currencies), the maturity of the loan (in months), the
type of the loan (generally revolver/line of credit or term loan), the primary purpose of the loan,
the terms of performance pricing, if any, and whether the loan tranche is secured and senior.
For my US borrowers, I collect firm data using Compustat. Dealscan does not have a
firm identifier that can be used to merge with other databases, so, consistent with prior studies, I
use the Roberts Dealscan-Compustat linking table (August 2010 vintage; Chava and Roberts,
2008). For international borrowers, I use Datastream’s Worldscope Fundamentals and merge the
international borrowers to Worldscope identifiers by firm name. I keep all loan observation for
which I am able to locate sufficient data to compute LN Assets, ROA, Leverage, Tangibility,

12

Consistent with Esty and Megginson (2003) and Qian and Strahan (2007), only about 30% of my non-US loans
have data for all in spread drawn. Virtually all (95%) of my US loans have data for all in spread drawn.
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MTB Assets, and Past Relation. In addition, for international observations, I require the firms to
have data from Worldscope about the accounting standards used to prepare financial statements
(local GAAP, IFRS, or US GAAP).13 I winsorize borrower financial characteristics at the .5%
level.
Finally, for country-level variables, I consult multiple sources. I obtain values for per
capita GDP from the World Development Indicators database from the Worldbank website. I
obtain values for sovereign ratings from Fitch and translate the letter ratings to an ordinal scale
whereby lower numbers reflect less risky ratings. Finally, my legal enforcement measure, Rule
of Law, is a country-year level measure from Kaufmann et al. (2009).
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the distribution of my loan sample by borrower country, lender country,
and year. After restricting loan observations by requiring each observation to have data for all
variables listed above (except the credit spread and the amount of the loan held by the lead bank,
as explained in section 5.1), my final sample consists of 4,223 international loan tranches over
the years 2000-2005. The loans originate from borrowers in 42 different countries. The majority
of loans originate from US borrowers (55%). The high concentration of US borrowers is due to
the paucity of firm-level variables available on Worldscope.

Other countries substantially

represented in my borrower sample include Hong Kong (11%), Australia (7.7%), the United
Kingdom (3.7%) and South Korea (3.1%). The loans originate from lenders in 32 countries.
The total number of loans listed in the lender country distribution is substantially larger, at 7,089
loans, as a substantial portion of my sample are syndicated loans with more than one lead bank
(46%), often domiciled in different countries. The number of lead banks is consistent with prior
studies at an average of 1.7 lead banks per loan (Sufi, 2007). The largest countries represented
13

My results are robust to the exclusion of financial firms.
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by lending banks are the US (24%) and the United Kingdom (21%), followed by Germany
(11%), Switzerland (8.5%), France (8.1%) and Canada (7.7%).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in my regression analyses. The
mean (median) credit spread is 203 (183) basis points. This variable is available for 2,850 loan
observations, or about 67% of my sample. Consistent with prior research, I find that DealScan
does not provide data about credit spreads for many loans originating with non-US borrowers
(Qian and Strahan, 2007). My mean (median) credit spread is substantially higher than credit
spreads reported in prior research which focus on within-country lending which may suggest that
firms pay more for loans with international banks than they would with a domestic bank (or
alternatively, that firms which borrow internationally have a higher credit risk). The mean
(median) number of lenders in my sample is 10.26 (8), and the mean (median) percent of the
loan held by the lead bank is 21.46% (15.49%).14 Covenant data is available for approximately
39% of my sample. This represents a slightly lower availability than prior studies relying only
on US borrowers. However, among US borrowers the availability of covenant data is consistent
with prior studies, and I control for US borrowers in my analyses. The mean (median) number
of financial covenants in a loan contract is 2.57 (3), which is comprised of approximately 1.92
(2) P-covenants, and 0.65 (1) C-covenant. The P-ratio has a mean of 0.72, which confirms that
contracting favors performance-based covenants by about 2-to-1.

My statistics are largely

consistent with prior research (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Christensen and
Nikolaev, 2012). My GAAP Differences variable reflects the degree of differences in accounting
systems between the borrower and the lending (lead) bank, and has a mean (median) of 4.05 (4).
I also provide descriptive statistics for borrower characteristics. Assets reflects that the

14

The Number of Lenders and Percent Held Lead variables are presented after excluding bilateral loans, where these
variables are equal to 1 and 100%, respectively.
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mean (median) value of total assets is approximately $US 11 billion ($US 236 million). The
mean (median) ROA is 6.1% (5.4%). The average leverage is about 30%, and the average
tangibility is 28%. Finally, the mean (median) market-to-book ratio of assets is 1.5 (1.2). Only
about 1% of borrowers have voluntarily adopted IFRS, and approximately 13% of the borrowers’
past loans have been with the same lending (lead) bank.
Finally, I provide descriptive statistics for the loan characteristics, and the country
characteristics of the borrower country. On average about 31% of the loan tranches are term
loans. The most common loan purposes represented in my sample are working capital (57%),
refinancing (18%), and acquisition (15%).

Approximately 27% of loans include some

performance pricing. This is lower than the frequency of performance pricing reported by other
studies (Asquith et al. (2005) report 41%), and is due to the international nature of my sample.
Consistent with prior studies, 43% of my loan tranches for US borrowers include performance
pricing provisions. The mean (median) tranche amount is US$ 291 million (US$ 100 million).
The mean (median) maturity is 39 months (48 months), which is consistent with samples in prior
studies (Hong et al., 2011; Bae and Goyal, 2009, Qian and Strahan, 2007).

Finally,

approximately 35% of loans are secured, and 99% are senior, consistent with prior studies (Ball
et al., 2008; Qian and Strahan, 2007). The mean (median) GDP per capital is $US 25,592 ($US
33,190). The average sovereign debt rating is 1.65, which translates to a rating between AAA
and AA+. The high rating is primarily due to the preponderance of US borrowers. Finally, the
average Rule of Law score is 1.41, where higher numbers indicate a stronger system of legal
enforcement.
6. Main Results
6.1 Credit Spread
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Table 3 presents the results of my test of H1. The coefficient on my test variable, GAAP
Differences, is 0.01 (3.04 if translated from the log into allinspreaddrawn) and is significant at
the 5% level (p-value = 0.05). This provides evidence that, in the pre-IFRS period, larger GAAP
Differences between the borrower and the lender are associated with a higher credit spread. A
higher credit spread in the presence of larger GAAP differences suggests that banks experience
information problems when they experience difficulty in understanding and interpreting the
borrower’s financial statements due to accounting standards differences. Although banks are
among the most sophisticated users of financial statements, these results suggest that banks are
not fully able to overcome differences in accounting standards when examining a non-domestic
borrower’s financial statements. This provides evidence that differences in accounting standards
impose contracting costs. Further, these costs are economically significant. The least number of
GAAP differences between countries in my sample is 0 (between the United Kingdom and
Ireland), while the largest difference is 17 (between Luxembourg and the United Kingdom). My
results suggest that if a borrowing company were to switch from a lender with the maximum
number of GAAP differences to a lender with the minimum number of GAAP differences (e.g. a
borrower in the United Kingdom switching from a Luxembourgish bank to an Irish bank) the
borrower could save in interest costs approximately 52 basis points (3.04 * 17). My results
suggest that lending banks experience difficulty understanding how accounting information
translates into default risk when financial statements are based on accounting standards which
are different from their own. More broadly, my results suggest that lending banks assign
additional fees and spreads to compensate for the additional effort and risk they assume by
lending to a borrower whose accounting information they find to be unfamiliar.
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The results for the control variables are largely consistent with prior studies. Consistent
with prior studies, the coefficient on LN Assets is negative and significant, which suggests that
larger companies have lower cost of debt. The ROA coefficient is negative and significant, and
appears to be one of the strongest determinants of the credit spread. This is consistent with
expectations that higher profitability is associated with a lower cost of debt. The coefficient on
Leverage is positive and significant: more highly levered firms generally experience a higher
cost of debt, as the default risk on subsequent debt is greater when a firm has a greater amount of
debt outstanding. Table 3 also suggests, consistent with prior studies, that term loans are
associated with a higher credit spread, as are tranches with the purpose of working capital,
CAPEX, refinancing, acquisitions, and other. The inclusion of a performance pricing term is
associated with a lower cost of debt. This is consistent with prior research on performance
pricing which suggests that performance pricing compensates the lender in the event of poor
borrower performance, and thus should decrease overall credit spread. 15 Larger loan amounts
are associated with smaller credit spreads, consistent with past studies which suggest that better
quality borrowers tend to be granted larger loan amounts as well as lower credit spreads.
Secured loans and loans with a longer maturity are associated with higher credit spreads, while
senior loans are associated with lower credit spreads. LN Sovereign Rating has a negative
coefficient, suggesting that borrowers from countries with superior sovereign debt ratings are in

15

Asquith, Beatty and Weber (2005) distinguish between interest-increasing performance pricing, which increases
credit spreads in the event of poor borrower performance, and interest-decreasing performance pricing, which
decreases credit spreads in the event of superior borrower performance. They find that interest-increasing
performance pricing is associated with significantly reduced credit spread, while interest-decreasing performance
pricing is only marginally associated with higher credit spread. The authors conclude that the primary pricing effect
of performance pricing is that lenders are willing to offer reduced credit spreads in exchange for interest-increasing
performance pricing. As my analysis does not control for the different types of performance pricing, I can assume
that either the effects of interest-increasing performance pricing overpower the effects of interest-decreasing
performance pricing in my sample, or that interest-increasing performance pricing terms are used more often in my
sample. Whether lenders would be more likely to use interest-increasing performance-pricing terms for
international loans remains a question for future research.
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fact charged a higher credit spread. This unusual result may be attributable to the preponderance
of US firms dominating my sample.16

Indeed the US dummy variable has a positive and

significant coefficient, suggesting that US firms are charged a higher credit spread to borrow
internationally than are firms in other countries. This is consistent with a cross-listing story,
where US borrowers seek out international sources of financing, and are willing to pay a
premium for these loans, in order to expand operations internationally. It is likely that US firms
seek loans internationally for internationally-based projects, which are inherently riskier.
Finally, the Rule of Law variable has a negative and significant coefficient, consistent with prior
findings that a stronger legal system is associated with a lower credit spread (Qian and Strahan,
2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009).
6.2 Syndicate Structure
Table 4 presents the results of my test of H2. The dependent variables tested in columns
1 and 2 are the number of lenders and the percentage of the loan held by the lead bank,
respectively. In both columns, the coefficient on GAAP Differences is significant in the direction
predicted (p=0.00). Together, these results suggest that lending banks form a more concentrated
loan syndicate when lending to a borrower using significantly different accounting standards
from their own. A concentrated syndicate is characterized by fewer banks in the syndicate and
the lead bank holding a larger proportion of the loan. The coefficients in columns 1 and 2
suggests that if a lead bank were to switch from a borrower with a maximum number of GAAP
differences to a borrower with a minimum number of GAAP differences, the bank would be able

16

Alternatively this may suggest one of two explanations: only the riskiest borrowers from countries with superior
debt ratings tend to borrow internationally; and/or only the least risky borrowers from countries with low debt
ratings tend to borrow internationally.
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to form a syndicate with approximately 5.78 more member banks (0.34*17) and would be able to
hold approximately 39% (2.29*17) less of the loan.17
The coefficients on my control variables are largely consistent with prior research. A
more concentrated syndicate structure is associated with strict legal enforcement.

This is

consistent with prior research on the effects of country-level legal enforcement on syndicated
loan structure, and suggests that banks are only willing to invest in monitoring and due diligence
efforts when they believe the borrower’s legal regime will enforce creditor rights in the event of
default (Esty and Megginson, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007).

Syndicate structure is less

concentrated for larger loans, term loans, senior loans, and loans with performance pricing
contract terms, consistent with prior studies.
6.3 Financial Covenants
6.3.1 Reliance on Financial Covenants
Table 5 presents the results of my test of H3. The coefficient on GAAP differences is
negative and significant (p=0.00). This provides evidence that banks write loan contracts with
fewer financial covenants when lending to borrowers with significantly different accounting
standards from their own, and whose accounting information they therefore find to be less
familiar.

The lower reliance on financial covenants in the presence of GAAP differences

suggests that when banks are less familiar with a borrower’s accounting information, they are
less willing to contract using those accounting numbers. The coefficient on GAAP Differences
of -0.010 suggests that if a borrower switches from a lender with the maximum number of

17

These regressions include bilateral loans where the syndicate size is 1 and the bank holds 100% of the loan.
Running the regressions in columns 1 and 2 excluding single-lender banks yields coefficients of -0.28 and 0.70,
respectively. Thus, within the syndicated loan sample, the effect of switching from a borrower with maximum
GAAP differences to minimum GAAP differences would be a loan syndicate with 4.8 more member banks (.28*17)
and a lead bank holding 12% less of the loan (.70*17). The significance of my results is robust to the exclusion of
bilateral loans.
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GAAP differences to a lender with the minimum number of GAAP differences, the borrower
will be subject to a loan contract with 0.17 more financial covenants (0.010*17). Given that the
average loan contract in my sample contains 2.57 covenants, this represents a 6.6% (0.17/2.57)
change in the use of financial covenants. Prior literature suggests that financial covenants may
act as a substitute for monitoring, helping the lender to monitor the borrower and thus reducing
the cost of debt (Bradley and Roberts, 2004). My results suggest that lenders will only substitute
covenants for monitoring when they are familiar with a borrower’s accounting standards. A firm
borrowing from a lender with significantly different accounting standards thus likely pays a
higher cost of debt and is subject to a closer monitoring relationship in exchange for a lower
reliance on direct contracting through the use of financial covenants.
My control variables in table 5 largely behave consistently with prior studies. Borrowers
are generally subject to more financial covenants when they are smaller, more highly leveraged,
and their assets are more tangible. They also experience fewer covenant restrictions when their
market-to-book ratio of assets is high; this suggests that firms with high growth potential have
less restrictive covenant packages. There is also a greater reliance on financial covenants when
the relationship between the borrower and the lender is stronger. This is consistent with banks
relying more heavily on financial covenants when they are more familiar with a borrower’s
accounting information. Loan tranches are more likely to include financial covenants when they
are term loans, have a larger loan amount and a longer maturity, include performance pricing
provisions, are secured, have a higher credit spread, and are for the purposes of working capital,
refinancing or acquisition.
6.3.2 Types of Financial Covenants

50

Table 6 presents the results of my test of H4. Columns 1 displays the results of the
regression of the variable P-covenants on GAAP Differences. In column 1 the coefficient on
GAAP Differences is negative and highly significant (p=0.00), which suggests that lenders tend
to write loan contracts using fewer performance-based covenants when they are unfamiliar with
borrowers’ accounting standards. Columns 2 displays the regression of the variable C-covenants
on GAAP Differences.

In column 2 the coefficient on GAAP Differences is positive and

significant (p=0.00), which suggests that lenders tend to write loan contracts using more capitalbased covenants when they are unfamiliar with borrowers’ accounting standards.

The

coefficients in columns 1 and 2 suggest that if a borrower were to switch from a lender with the
maximum number of GAAP differences to a lender with the minimum number of GAAP
differences, she would face a loan contract with approximately 0.37 additional performancebased covenants (0.022*17), and 0.20 fewer capital-based covenants (.012*17). Based on the
mean values from table 2, this would represent an increase in reliance on performance-based
covenants of 19% (0.37/1.92) and a decrease in reliance on capital-based covenants of 31%
(0.20/0.65).

Finally, column 3 uses as a dependent variable the P-ratio, or the ratio of

performance-based covenants to total financial covenants, and should capture the choice of the
mix of covenants in contracts using both P-and C-covenants. In column 3 the coefficient on
GAAP Differences is negative and significant (p=0.00). This suggests that lenders alter the mix
of covenants away from P-covenants and toward C-covenants when faced with a borrower using
substantially different accounting standards. These results are consistent with Christensen and
Nikolaev’s (2012) findings that banks tend to use performance-based covenants only when they
find borrowers’ accounting information to be contractible.

My results complement these
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findings, and shed new light on another factor affecting the choice between performance- and
capital-based financial covenants.
7. Additional Analyses
As an additional analysis, I examine the same model while adding the post-IFRS period
to my analyses. One key concern with my analyses is that a test of international loans may suffer
from self-selection bias. As I rely on a sample of international loans, where the borrower and
lender are domiciled in different countries, one concern is that there may be something particular
about the nature of international loans that makes them fundamentally different than domestic
loans, and thus my results may not generalize to other parties writing debt contracts. A borrower
seeking out international financing could be similar to an equity cross-listing firm, who does so
for “good business” reasons, such as seeking out international markets as a point of entry for
operational expansion (Lang et al., 2003). That is, a borrower could seek out international debt
to establish itself in a foreign market in which it wishes to do business. Alternatively, a borrower
with existing international operations might seek international lenders as a hedging tool to offset
foreign assets or simply because they would tend to work with international banks as part of their
foreign operations.

In addition, banks sometimes enter foreign markets for competitive

purposes, which could be a major driving factor behind international lending. I capitalize on the
exogenous shock of mandatory IFRS adoption, after which prescribed differences in accounting
standards are nonexistent, while incentives to borrow internationally should be largely
unchanged.
In addition, a test that includes the post-mandatory IFRS period can also correct for
endogeneity problems due to omitted correlated country-level variables. While the Bae et al.
(2008) GAAP Differences measure purports to capture differences in prescribed accounting
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standards, this measure may also pick up other country-level effects to the extent that it is
correlated with enforcement, interpretation, cultural differences, or a country’s stage of
development. The ensuing endogeneity problem raises concerns that my findings are not truly
attributable to differences in prescribed standards but rather to omitted correlated variables
capturing other country-level differences. I capitalize on the exogenous shock of mandatory
IFRS adoption, an event after which accounting standards differences drastically decrease, but
other country-level differences should largely be unchanged.18

Differences in accounting

systems across countries include differences in prescribed financial reporting standards as well as
differences in the application, interpretation, and enforcement of these standards. For example,
while the same set of IFRS are prescribed across the European Union, Australia, and South
Africa since fiscal year 2005, research suggests that this harmonization of prescribed accounting
standards has not resulted in a uniform interpretation and application of the standards (Daske et
al., 2008; Daske et al., 2013).

Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) examine the accounting

treatment of various assets before and after IFRS adoption in a sample of German and UK firms.
They find evidence that borrowers’ measurement choice of assets under IFRS is significantly
associated with the measurement under prior local GAAP.

KPMG and by the European

Commission performed studies of the 2005 and 2006 financial statements, respectively, for a set
of large firms from IFRS adopting countries. These studies concluded that differences in the
application of IFRS existed at the country level, and were strongly associated with accounting
policies under prior national GAAP (KPMG and von Keitz, 2006; European Commission, 2008).
Haller and Wehrfritz (2013) and Kvaal and Nobes (2010, 2012) study accounting choices that
18

The Kaufmann et al. (2009) measure controls for concurrent changes in enforcement. In addition, as a sensitivity
test, I run all tests on a shorter window. I restrict the pre-IFRS period to 2003-2005 and the post-IFRS period to
2006-2007. This should help control for concurrent changes in legal enforcement surrounding IFRS adoption
(Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, 2013). This should also address any concerns about the credit bubble in 2000-2002,
and the financial crisis beginning in 2008. My results are robust to this alternative time period.
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are available under IFRS and conclude that firms tend to choose options which retain accounting
policies under national GAAP. Further, these studies document that these national differences
persist from 2005 to 2009. These studies strongly suggest that in the post-IFRS period, national
accounting differences persist and prevent full comparability, and that these differences are
strongly correlated with national GAAP differences prior to IFRS adoption. For this reason, in
the post-IFRS period, the GAAP Differences measure should capture national accounting
differences which persist after IFRS adoption as a result of prior differences in local GAAP. I
run the following model:
Contract/Syndicate characteristic = α1 + α2GAAP Differences + α3Post-IFRS + α4GAAP
Differences*Post-IFRS + α3Borrower Characteristics + α4Loan Characteristics +
α5Country Characteristics + ε
The coefficient α2 captures the effect of GAAP differences on the dependent variable in
the pre-IFRS period. The Post-IFRS dummy variable controls for fixed (levels) differences
between the pre- and post-IFRS periods. Thus the coefficient α4 on the interaction term GAAP
Differences*Post-IFRS measures the change in the effect of GAAP differences on the dependent
variable from the pre- to post-IFRS periods. This coefficient therefore captures the amount of
the GAAP differences effect that disappears in the post-IFRS period. This may be interpreted as
the effect of GAAP differences attributable solely to differences in prescribed standards, and not
differences in other country-level factors. As the coefficient measures the portion of the effect
that disappears in the post-IFRS period, this test can isolate the portion of the effects that are
attributable to differences in prescribed accounting standards.
Table 7 presents the results of my additional analyses. I find that my results hold from
the pre-IFRS tests, and my inferences are largely unchanged. In column 1 in the top row, the
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coefficient on the interaction term GAAP Difference*Post-IFRS is negative and significant. The
coefficient on the interaction term captures the portion of the effect of GAAP differences on
credit spreads that disappears with the exogenous shock of mandatory IFRS adoption. I interpret
that a greater difference in prescribed GAAP is associated with a higher credit spread. Columns
2 and 3 test the effects of GAAP differences on the syndicate structure. The coefficients in
Column 2 suggest that a single GAAP difference is associated with a loan syndicate with 0.37
fewer members, and that 0.15 of this effect is attributable to differences in prescribed standards,
and thus disappears after mandatory IFRS adoption (p=0.00). Similarly, column 3 suggests that
a single GAAP difference is associated with a lead bank holding 2.79% more of the loan, and
that 1.83% of this effect is attributable to differences in prescribed standards (p=0.00).
In the lower panel, the test of financial covenants, I find that the post-IFRS period is
associated with a significantly lower reliance on financial covenants, consistent with Ball et al.
(2013), as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on Post-IFRS (p=0.00). I also
find that GAAP differences are associated with a significantly lower reliance on financial
covenants, and that this effect largely disappears in the post-IFRS period.

Although the

coefficient on the interaction term is not significant, untabulated tests confirm that the sum of the
coefficients on GAAP Differences and the interaction term are insignificantly different from zero.
I conclude that while GAAP differences are associated with a lower reliance on financial
covenants in the pre-IFRS period, this effect largely disappears in the post-IFRS period and thus
is likely attributable to differences in prescribed accounting standards. Columns 2 – 4 in the
lower panel confirm my findings that GAAP differences are associated with a greater reliance on
capital-based covenants and a lesser reliance on performance-based covenants. This table further
demonstrates that this effect is almost solely attributable to differences in prescribed accounting
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standards, as evidenced by the similar values for the coefficients on GAAP Differences and on
the interaction term (i.e., the effect of GAAP differences in the pre-IFRS period almost
completely disappears in the post-IFRS period). In addition, consistent with Ball et al. (2013) I
find that the post-IFRS period is associated with a lower reliance on both performance- and
capital-based covenants, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficients on Post-IFRS
in the tests of P-covenants and C-covenants (p=0.00 and 0.06, respectively).19 However, the
post-IFRS effect appears to be strongest for P-covenants, which suggests that lenders most
strongly reduce their reliance on performance-based covenants in the post-IFRS period. This
analysis thus complements the results of Ball et al. (2012) by showing that in the post-IFRS
period, banks are especially like to reduce their reliance on performance-based covenants.
8. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between financial reporting
differences and the terms and structure of debt contracts. I focus on differences in accounting
information that arise in debt contracts where contracting parties are domiciled in different
countries and are thus subject to different accounting standards.

I find that larger GAAP

differences are associated with higher credit spreads and fees, suggesting that borrowers are
charged a higher spread and higher fees to compensate for the bank’s lack of familiarity with
their accounting system. I find that larger GAAP differences between a borrower and a lending
(lead) bank are associated with a more concentrated loan syndicate, i.e. fewer banks in the
syndicate, and the lead bank holding a greater portion of the loan. I find that larger GAAP
differences between a borrower and a lending (lead) bank are associated with less reliance on
debt covenants. I also find that when GAAP differences are larger, banks rely more heavily on

19

Ball et al. (2013) test separately the effects of income-statement and balance-sheet covenants. This should be
largely similar to a test of performance-based and capital-based covenants.
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capital-based covenants, and less heavily on performance-based covenants. My results suggest
that when banks are unfamiliar with a borrower’s accounting information, they are less likely to
write contracts using performance-based covenants, which require the borrower’s accounting
information to be a timely reflection of deteriorating credit risk. I conclude that when banks find
a borrower’s accounting information to be unfamiliar, they are particularly unwilling to attest to
the timeliness of earnings with respect to credit risk. However, it is also possible that some
borrowers purposely seek out lenders with GAAP differences, and are willing to pay more for
this type of loan, in order to avoid committing to performance-based covenants. This may be
profitable for a firm which has private information about future volatility of earnings. This
question could be a fruitful area for future research.
Finally, in additional analyses using the mandatory adoption of IFRS as an exogenous
shock to the accounting system, I document that a significant portion of the effects of GAAP
differences on debt contracting disappear in the post-IFRS period. I conclude that a significant
portion of the effects I document are indeed attributable to differences in prescribed accounting
standards. These results speak more generally to the costs of contracting among parties with
accounting differences.

My results are also consistent with the idea that local accounting

standards evolve to facilitate contracting in a particular geographical area (Schipper, 2005; Ball,
2006), and further suggest that contracting across different jurisdictions may be more costly than
contracting within a single jurisdiction. These results are particularly relevant to a post-IFRS
world in which significant evidence suggests that country-level differences in accounting
systems persist among IFRS users.
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TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF LOAN SAMPLE BY COUNTRY AND YEAR

Panel A: Borrower Country
Borrower
#
Country
Loans
Argentina
9

Borrower
Country
South Korea

#
Loans
132

Panel B: Lender Country
Lender
#
Country
Loans
Australia
208

Lender
Country
Japan

#
Loans
322

Australia

327

Luxembourg

5

Austria

13

South Korea

31

Belgium

3

Malaysia

46

Belgium

34

14

Brazil

3

Mexico

2

Canada

543

Canada

64

The Netherlands

27

China

154

Malaysia
The
Netherlands
Norway

74
30

Chile

2

New Zealand

16

Denmark

24

Philippines

4

China

39

Norway

30

Egypt

2

Portugal

2

Czech Republic

3

Philippines

4

France

571

Singapore

Denmark

21

Poland

12

Germany

755

South Africa

9

110

Egypt

5

Portugal

6

Greece

14

Spain

56

Finland

7

Russia

1

Hong Kong

104

Sweden

8

France

65

Singapore

76

Hungary

3

Switzerland

602

Germany

23

South Africa

11

India

21

Taiwan

90

Greece

15

Spain

11

Ireland

15

25

Hong Kong

449

Sweden

17

Israel

10

Italy

37

Thailand
United
Kingdom
United States

Hungary

5

Switzerland

8

India

77

Taiwan

98

Indonesia

1

Thailand

34

Ireland

13

Turkey

16

Israel

3

United Kingdom

158

Japan

33

United States

2346

TOTAL

TOTAL

1487
1717
7089

4223

Panel C: Loan
Year

2000

#
Loans
445

2001

607

2002

734

2003

837

2004

824

2005

776

Year

TOTAL

4223
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable

N

Mean

SD

P25

P50

P75

Dependent Variables
All in Spread

2850

203.25

149.37

85.00

182.50

280.00

Number of Lenders

3119

10.26

10.27

4.00

8.00

14.00

Percent Held Lead

1024

21.46

17.18

10.00

15.49

25.00

Financial Covenants

1637

2.57

0.99

2.00

3.00

3.00

P-covenants

1637

1.92

1.10

1.00

2.00

3.00

C-covenants

1637

0.65

0.74

0.00

1.00

1.00

P-ratio

1637

0.72

0.34

0.50

0.80

1.00

4223

4.05

3.76

0.00

4.00

7.00

LN Assets

4223

23.12

3.16

15.83

19.28

21.17

ROA

4223

0.06

0.05

0.02

0.05

0.10

Test Variables
GAAP Differences
Borrower Characteristics

Leverage

4223

0.30

0.18

0.16

0.29

0.45

Tangibility

4223

0.28

0.25

0.03

0.23

0.50

MTB Assets

4223

1.49

0.64

1.03

1.24

1.73

Voluntary IFRS

4223

0.01

0.12

0.00

0.00

0.00

Past Relation

4223

0.13

0.25

0.00

0.00

0.16

Term Loan Indicator

4223

0.31

0.46

0.00

0.00

1.00

Purpose - Working Capital

4223

0.57

0.50

0.00

1.00

1.00

Purpose - CAPEX

4223

0.03

0.16

0.00

0.00

0.00

Purpose - Refinancing

4223

0.18

0.38

0.00

0.00

0.00

Purpose - Acquisition

4223

0.15

0.36

0.00

0.00

0.00

Purpose - Backup

4223

0.03

0.17

0.00

0.00

0.00

Purpose - Other

4223

0.05

0.21

0.00

0.00

0.00

Performance Pricing Indicator

4223

0.27

0.45

0.00

0.00

1.00

LN Tranche Amount

4223

19.49

1.53

17.28

18.42

19.41

LN Maturity

4223

3.66

0.73

3.18

3.87

4.09

Secured

4223

0.35

0.48

0.00

0.00

1.00

Senior

4223

0.99

0.09

1.00

1.00

1.00

LN GDP

4223

10.15

0.79

10.11

10.41

10.51

LN Sovereign Rating

4223

0.50

0.75

0.00

0.00

1.10

Rule of Law

4223

1.41

0.43

1.47

1.53

1.62

Loan Characteristics

Country Characteristics

Variable Definitions: See Appendix A.
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TABLE 3
EFFECT OF GAAP DIFFERENCES ON CREDIT SPREAD AND FEES
Log Spread
Coeff
T-stat

Variables
GAAP Differences

0.0093

**

2.03

LN Assets

-0.1274

***

-6.26

ROA

-1.6323

***

-4.70

0.9111

***

10.02

Leverage
Tangibility

0.0921

0.95

MTB Assets

-0.0627

-1.17

Voluntary IFRS

0.1350

0.71

Past Relation

0.0541

**

2.42

Term Loan Indicator

0.2244

***

13.25

Purpose - Working capital

0.4221

***

8.15

Purpose - CAPEX

0.3494

***

3.64

Purpose - Refinancing

0.4119

***

4.25

Purpose - Acquisition

0.6815

***

19.38

Purpose - Other

0.5751

***

9.20

Performance Pricing Indicator

-0.0734

***

-4.04

LN Tranche Amount

-0.0430

***

-3.83

0.0758

***

5.04

0.3593

***

10.28

-0.8635

***

-9.02

LN Maturity
Secured
Senior
LN GDP

0.0534

0.39

LN Sovereign Rating

-0.3315

**

-2.11

Rule of Law

-0.5048

*

-1.60

US-Dummy

1.3744

***

7.24

Intercept

6.9196

***

5.81

Industry Indicators

Yes

Year Indicators

Yes

Adjusted R

2

0.61
Number of Observations
2850
This table reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions relating credit spreads and fees to how familiar a
lending bank is with a borrower’s accounting information. The degree of familiarity between the borrower and the
lender is measured as the degree of GAAP differences between each party’s country of origin. All borrowing firm
financial variables are winsorized at the .5% level. Standard errors are clustered by borrower country. Industry and
year indicator variables are included. For definitions of all variables, see Appendix A. *, **, and *** represent the
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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TABLE 4
EFFECT OF GAAP DIFFERENCES ON SYNDICATE STRUCTURE
Number of Lenders
Variables

Coeff

GAAP Differences

-0.34

LN Assets

-0.03

ROA

-7.63
2.91

Leverage
Tangibility

T-stat

Percentage Held Lead
Coeff

T-stat

-4.13

2.29

-0.19

0.74

1.49

**

-2.46

-19.81

-0.94

***

3.56

-15.49

-1.00

-6.99

***

-0.94

***

**

4.58

-2.08
-1.25

MTB Assets

0.40

1.18

-3.46

Voluntary IFRS

6.18

1.60

-3.28

-0.60

Past Relation

0.54

1.09

-1.49

-0.24

Term Loan Indicator

2.30

4.84

-12.08

-1.32

-1.66

15.86

0.36

0.32

10.98

0.94

Purpose - Refinancing

-0.09

-0.12

4.76

0.80

Purpose - Acquisition

-1.07

-2.43

22.57

***

Purpose - Other

-1.94

-1.30

18.72

**
***

-12.04

***

-9.54

Purpose - Working capital
Purpose - CAPEX

-1.53

***
*

**

Performance Pricing Indicator

3.63

***

5.24

-23.98

LN Tranche Amount

2.39

***

12.01

-11.40
1.49

LN Maturity

-0.50

-0.93

Secured

-0.04

-0.09

-0.99

7.45

-30.58

*

*

-1.75

1.88

2.72
2.07

1.25
-0.41

Senior

4.54

LN GDP

0.55

1.06

0.39

0.15

LN Sovereign Rating

-1.13

-1.23

0.41

0.17

Rule of Law

-2.87

-2.07

11.93

-1.86

-1.27

-1.27

0.01

***

3.55

-4.99

255.70

***

7.65

US-Dummy
All in Spread
Intercept

-2.13

***

**
*

0.00
-38.34

***

***

**

Yes

Yes

Year Indicators

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R

0.28

2.24
-0.46

Industry Indicators
2

-5.75

0.61

Number of Observations
4223
2128
This table reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions relating syndicate structure to how familiar a lending
bank is with a borrower’s accounting information. The degree of familiarity between the borrower and the lender is
measured as the degree of GAAP differences between each party’s country of origin. Syndicate structure is
measured as alternatively Number of Lenders, the number of banks in the syndicate, and Percentage Held Lead, the
amount of the loan held by the lead bank. All borrowing firm financial variables are winsorized at the .5% level.
Standard errors are clustered by borrower country. Industry and year indicator variables are included. For
definitions of all variables, see Appendix A. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
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TABLE 5
EFFECT OF GAAP DIFFERENCES ON THE USE OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS
Financial Covenants
Coeff
T-stat

Variables
GAAP Differences

-0.010

***

-4.56

LN Assets

-0.114

***

-6.61

ROA

0.403

1.21

Leverage

0.267

***

Tangibility

0.234

***

4.09

MTB Assets

-0.071

**

-2.02

3.05

Voluntary IFRS

1.027

1.38

Past Relation

0.296

***

16.97

Term Loan Indicator

0.076

***

4.37

Purpose - Working capital

0.430

***

21.82

Purpose - CAPEX

0.134

Purpose - Refinancing

0.318

***

7.90

Purpose - Acquisition

0.555

***

30.46

Purpose - Other

0.040

Performance Pricing Indicator

0.182

***

11.69

LN Tranche Amount

0.053

**

2.24

LN Maturity

0.203

***

8.28

Secured

0.249

***

8.26

Senior

0.032

*

1.77

1.36

1.55

LN GDP

-0.156

***

-2.71

LN Sovereign Rating

-0.437

*

-1.96

Rule of Law

0.057

US-Dummy

0.770

***

0.23
3.51

All in Spread

0.001

***

5.37

Intercept

2.649

***

3.36

Industry Indicators

Yes

Year Indicators

Yes

Adjusted R

2

0.25
Number of Observations
1637
This table reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions relating the use of financial covenants in debt
contracts to how familiar a lending bank is with a borrower’s accounting information. The degree of familiarity
between the borrower and the lender is measured as the degree of GAAP differences between each party’s country
of origin. Financial Covenants is measured as the number of accounting-based covenants included in the loan
contract. All borrowing firm financial variables are winsorized at the .5% level. Standard errors are clustered by
borrower country. Industry and year indicator variables are included. For definitions of all variables, see Appendix
A. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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TABLE 6
EFFECT OF GAAP DIFFERENCES ON TYPES OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS
P-covenants
Coeff
T-stat

Variables

P-ratio
Coeff
T-stat

GAAP Differences

-0.02

-11.21

0.01

***

5.72

-0.01

***

-5.11

LN Assets

-0.02

-1.41

-0.09

***

-14.13

0.01

**

2.18

ROA

0.16

0.45

0.25

1.09

0.33

*

1.94

Leverage

1.14

***

15.00

-0.87

***

-22.86

0.40

***

22.51

Tangibility

-0.39

***

-8.11

0.62

***

20.26

-0.18

***

-10.72

MTB Assets

0.09

***

5.19

-0.16

***

-4.01

0.05

***

7.99

Voluntary IFRS

0.64

1.13

0.39

1.06

-0.17

-0.87

Past Relation

0.20

***

13.42

0.09

***

5.37

0.00

-0.16

Term Loan Indicator

0.13

***

5.75

-0.06

***

-3.04

0.03

***

0.37

***

14.99

0.06

***

3.40

0.07

***

-0.47

0.19

***

4.14

-0.06

Purpose - Working capital
Purpose - CAPEX

***

C-covenants
Coeff
T-stat

-0.06

*

3.25
4.83
-1.98

Purpose - Refinancing

0.37

***

13.18

-0.06

**

-2.15

0.12

***

7.94

Purpose - Acquisition

0.68

***

26.07

-0.12

***

-5.76

0.16

***

8.35

Purpose - Other

0.13

***

4.17

-0.09

***

-3.68

0.04

*

2.03

Performance Pricing Indicator

0.29

***

16.21

-0.11

***

-5.99

0.07

***

9.75

LN Tranche Amount

0.06

***

2.92

-0.01

-1.25

0.01

LN Maturity

0.40

***

14.58

-0.20

***

-16.49

0.10

***

0.39

Secured

0.99
7.43

***

20.69

-0.14

***

-6.02

0.10

***

12.10

Senior

-0.23

***

-12.15

0.26

***

16.10

-0.12

***

-14.75

LN GDP

-0.25

***

-3.33

0.10

1.59

-0.11

**

-2.34

LN Sovereign Rating

-0.79

***

-6.26

0.35

1.56

-0.38

***

-3.99

*

-1.78

Rule of Law

0.18

0.65

-0.12

-0.44

0.04

US-Dummy

0.06

0.34

0.71

***

2.77

-0.21

All in Spread

0.00

17.43

0.00

***

-5.58

0.00

***

15.57

Intercept

0.60

1.07

2.05

***

2.91

0.92

**

2.01

***

0.35

Industry Indicators

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Indicators

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R

2

Number of Observations

0.43

0.29

0.36

1637

1637

1637
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This table reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions relating the use of different types of financial
covenants in debt contracts to how familiar a lending bank is with a borrower’s accounting information. The degree
of familiarity between the borrower and the lender is measured as the degree of GAAP differences between each
party’s country of origin. P-covenants is defined as the number of earnings-based covenants included in the loan
contracts, including the fixed-charge coverage ratio, debt service coverage ratio, interest coverage ratio and cash
interest coverage ratio, and ratios of debt or senior debt to EBITDA.. C-covenants is defined as the number of
capital-based covenants included in the loan contract, including the leverage ratio, debt-to-tangible net worth ratio,
debt-equity ratio, current ratio, and minimum levels of net worth or tangible net worth. The P-ratio is defined as the
ratio of performance-based covenants total financial covenants. All borrowing firm financial variables are
winsorized at the .5% level. Standard errors are clustered by borrower country. Industry and year indicator
variables are included. For definitions of all variables, see Appendix A. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5% and
1% significance levels, respectively.
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TABLE 7
EFFECT OF GAAP DIFFERENCES ON TERMS OF DEBT CONTRACTS, CONTROLLING FOR MANDATORY IFRS
ADOPTION

Variables
GAAP Differences
Post-IFRS
GAAP Differences * Post IFRS

Log Spread
Coeff
T-stat
0.011
0.607
-0.014

***
***
**

2.60
4.65
-2.08

Number of Lenders
Coeff
T-stat

Percentage Held Lead
Coeff
T-stat

-5.25

2.788

-2.238

***
***

-3.75

-6.804

0.153

***

2.90

-1.832

-0.369

***

5.25
-1.17

***

Industry Indicators

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Indicators

Yes

Yes

Yes

-4.45

Adjusted R2

0.58

0.27

0.65

Number of Observations

7491

10941

4054

Variables

Financial Covenants
Coeff
T-stat

P-covenants
Coeff
T-stat

C-covenants
Coeff
T-stat

GAAP Differences

-0.014

***

-4.85

-0.031

Post-IFRS

-0.376

***

-6.17

-0.252

***
***

0.028

***

GAAP Differences * Post IFRS

0.012

1.16

-13.62

0.017

-3.92

-0.124

4.12

-0.016

***

P-ratio
Coeff
T-stat

7.69

-0.009

*

-1.95

0.061

***

-3.14

0.004

***

-7.52
1.39

**

Industry Indicators

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Indicators

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

2.20

Adjusted R2

0.27
0.36
0.36
0.36
Number of Observations
3472
3472
3472
3472
This table reports the results of an additional analysis in which I add the post-mandatory IFRS adoption period (post 2005) to my tests in tables 3-6. The
coefficient on the interaction term GAAP Difference*Post-IFRS should capture the change in the effect of GAAP Differences on the dependent variable from
pre-IFRS to post-IFRS. This should therefore be the portion of the effect which is attributable solely to prescribed differences in financial reporting standards.
The coefficient estimates are from OLS regressions and all variables are defined as in tables 3-6. All borrowing firm financial variables are winsorized at the
.5% level. Standard errors are clustered by borrower country. Industry and year indicator variables are included. For definitions of all variables, see Appendix
A. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Test Variables:
GAAP Differences: The number of differences between the GAAP used by the borrower and the
GAAP in the lending bank’s country of origin, as defined in Table 1 of Bae et al. (2008).
In the event of multiple lead banks domiciled in different countries, GAAP Differences
takes the value of the smallest of the GAAP Differences measures for all of the lead
banks.
Log Spread: The log of All in Spread Drawn, a variable from LPC’s Dealscan which measures
all fees and credit spreads, measured as the basis point spread over LIBOR.
Number of Lenders: The total number of banks in the loan syndicate.
Percent Held Lead: The percentage of the loan held by the lead bank in the loan syndicate or, in
loan observations with more than one lead bank, the average percentage of the loan held
by all lead banks.
Financial Covenants: The number of financial covenants included in the loan contract
P-covenants: The number of earnings-based covenants included in the loan contracts, including
the fixed-charge coverage ratio, debt service coverage ratio, interest coverage ratio and
cash interest coverage ratio, and ratios of debt or senior debt to EBITDA.
C-covenants: The number of capital-based covenants included in the loan contract, including the
leverage ratio, debt-to-tangible net worth ratio, debt-equity ratio, current ratio, and
minimum levels of net worth or tangible net worth.
P-ratio: The ratio of performance-to-total financial covenants included in the loan contract, or P
covenants/(P-covenants + C-covenants).
Post-IFRS: Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan is issued in 2006 or later, and 0
otherwise.
Borrower Characteristics:
LN Assets: The natural log of total assets (in US$) at the end of the most recent fiscal year
before the loan contract is signed.
ROA: The ratio of operating income to total assets (in US$) at the end of the most recent fiscal
year before the loan contract is signed.
Leverage: Total debt divided by total assets (in US$) at the end of the most recent fiscal year
before the loan contract is signed.
Tangibility: The ratio of PP&E to total assets (in US$) at the end of the most recent fiscal year
before the loan contract is signed.
MTB Assets: The market value of assets (total assets less book value of equity plus market value
of common equity) divided by total assets (in US$) at the end of the most recent fiscal
year before the loan contract is signed.
Voluntary IFRS: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm uses IFRS instead
of local GAAP in the financial statements at the end of the most recent fiscal year before
the loan contract is signed, and 0 otherwise.
Past Relation: The number of private loans initiated by the borrowing firm in the past five years
(with respect to the loan tranche) which were made with the same bank (lead bank)
divided by the total number of private loans initiated by the borrowing firm in the past
five years.
US-Dummy: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the borrower is a US-based firm,
and 0 otherwise.
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS - Continued
Loan Characteristics:
Term Loan Indicator: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the loan is a term loan,
and 0 otherwise.
Purpose- Working Capital: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the loan has a
Primary purpose of working capital, and 0 otherwise.
Purpose – CAPEX: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the loan has a primary
purpose of capital expenditures, and 0 otherwise.
Purpose – Refinancing: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the loan has a
primary purpose of refinancing, and 0 otherwise.
Purpose – Acquisition: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the loan has a primary
purpose of acquisition, and 0 otherwise.
Purpose – Backup: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the loan has a primary
purpose of backup, and 0 otherwise.
Purpose – Other: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the loan has a primary
purpose that does not fall into one of the five previous categories listed, and 0
otherwise.
Performance Pricing Indicator: an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the loan
contract includes performance pricing, and 0 otherwise.
LN Tranche Amount: The natural log of the loan tranche amount (in $US).
LN Maturity: The natural log of the maturity of the loan, in months.
Secured: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the loan is secured, and 0 otherwise.
Senior: An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the loan is senior, and 0 otherwise.
Country Characteristics:
LN GDP: the natural log of annual values of GDP per capita for the borrower’s country.
LN Sovereign Rating: The natural log of the country-level sovereign risk rating (from Fitch)
issued most recently prior to the deal active date, transformed to an ordinal scale so
that smaller numbers represent the least risky ratings.
Rule of Law: A country-year-level measure of the quality of a country’s legal and enforcement
environment from Kaufmann et al., (2009), where higher scores equate to stronger legal
enforcement.
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